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Executive summary  
This document is Deliverable D2.2 of Task T2.2, WP2 – Privacy of the PROTECT project. The aim of D2.2 is to 
explore the current and proposed European legal framework regulating biometric Schengen border control 
in order to identify legal, privacy and data protection constraints which should be taken into account by 
PROTECT scenarios described in D3.11. 
In order to be able to identify the legal constraints under current and proposed EU law for the usage of the 
multimodal biometric “on the move” solutions developed within the PROTECT project scenarios in D3.1, the 
first preliminary question which should be raised is: “Which is the exact purpose/extent of the border checks 
that could be “facilitated” thanks to the PROTECT system?”. Indeed, according to article 5 of the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), one of the main principles relating to the processing of personal data is 
the purpose limitation principle, according to which “personal data shall be collected for specified, explicit 
and legitimate purposes”. 
In this Deliverable, it is assumed that the purpose of D3.1 scenarios is to “facilitate” public border control 
authorities to speed up their public interest missions of border control management by enrolling additional 
biometrics in travel documents (or smartphone apps acting as travel documents).  
Bearing this public interest purpose fact in mind, the purpose of this Deliverable is to thoroughly analyse:  
 Legal constraints deriving from legislation regulating EU travel documents (E-Passports, residence 
permits, visas), Schengen IT systems (in particular, VIS, SIS, EES, SLTD, API and ETIAS) and more 
generally legislation regulating cross-border movements at the Schengen external borders (the 
Schengen Borders Code) 
 Legal privacy constraints related to the collection, storage and processing of personal data for 
public interest missions, in particular biometric data. These legal constraints are mainly regulated 
by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Directive 95/46/EC and the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).  
Without any will to pre-empt any conclusions, it is a fact that the scenarios proposed by D3.1 should more 
than certainly be considered as beyond the scope of current EU legislation. One of the main reasons of this 
conclusion is that consent of travellers cannot be considered as a legitimate basis of lawfulness under the 
GDPR to allow public border control authorities to speed up their public interest missions by enrolling 
additional biometrics in travel documents (which currently may not be replaced by a smartphone app).  
This being said, Deliverable “D2.3 - Privacy impact of next-generation biometric border control” will analyse 
if, as an alternative to D3.1 scenarios, emerging biometric modalities could be processed in a “passport 
companion” such as a smartphone for “comfort and convenience purposes” of travellers on basis of their 
consent. The idea would be to analyse − from a privacy and data protection point of view − the possibility 
and the conditions to enrol additional biometrics in a smartphone app for travellers willing to join a “PROTECT 
programme” allowing them to be given priority in waiting areas for “traditional” security and border checks 
and/or allowing them to benefit of additional convenience services such as access to VIP parking zones or 
waiting lounges. 
 
                                                          
1 D3.1 -  User requirements and scenarios.  
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Definitions 
Article 29 Working Party: The Article 29 Working Party is composed of representatives from all EU Data 
Protection Authorities, the EDPS and the European Commission. It was set up under the Directive 95/46/EC. 
It has advisory status and acts independently.  
Automated Border Control system: means a system which allows for an automated border passage, and 
which is composed of a self-service system and an eGate.  
Biometric data: Article 4(14) of the GDPR defines “biometric data” as personal data resulting from specific 
technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, 
which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic 
data. 
Biometric template: Key features can be extracted from the raw form of biometric data (e.g. facial 
measurements from an image) and stored for later processing rather than the raw data itself. This forms the 
biometric template of the data. The definition of the size (the quantity of information) of the template is a 
crucial issue. On the one hand, the size of the template should be wide enough to manage security (avoiding 
overlaps between different biometric data, or identity substitutions), on the other hand, the size of the 
template should not be too large so as to avoid the risks of biometric data reconstruction. The generation of 
the template should be a one-way process, in that it should not be possible to regenerate the raw biometric 
data from the template. 
Biometric enrolment: Encompasses all the processes that are carried out within a biometric system in order 
to extract biometric data from a biometric source and link this data to an individual. The quantity and the 
quality of data required during enrolment should be sufficient to allow for his/her accurate identification, 
authentication, categorization or verification without recording excessive data. The amount of data extracted 
from a biometric source during the enrolment phase has to be adequate for the purpose of the processing 
and the level of performance of the biometric system. 
Biometric storage: The data obtained during enrolment can be stored locally in the operations centre where 
the enrolment took place (e.g. in a reader) for later use, or on a device carried by the individual (e.g. on a 
smart card) or could be sent and stored in a centralized database accessible by one or more biometric 
systems. 
Biometric matching: It is the process of comparing biometric data/template (captured during enrolment) to 
the biometric data/template collected from a new sample for the purpose of identification, 
verification/authentication or categorization. 
Biometric identification: The identification of an individual by a biometric system is typically the process of 
comparing biometric data of an individual (acquired at the time of the identification) to a number of 
biometric templates stored in a database (i.e. a one-to-many matching process). 
Biometric verification/authentication: The verification of an individual by a biometric system is typically the 
process of comparing the biometric data of an individual (acquired at the time of the verification) to a single 
biometric template stored in a device (i.e. a one-to-one matching process). 
eGate: means an infrastructure operated by electronic means where the effective crossing of an external 
border takes place. 
European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS): The system will apply to visa-exempt third 
country nationals, as well as those who are exempt from the airport transit visa requirement. They will need 
to obtain a travel authorisation before their trip, via an online application. The information submitted in each 
application will be automatically processed against other EU databases to determine whether there are 
grounds to refuse a travel authorisation. When no hits or elements requiring further analysis are identified, 
the travel authorisation will be issued automatically within a short time. If there is a hit or an element 
requiring analysis, the application will be handled manually by the competent authorities.  
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Facial image: means digital images of the face with sufficient image resolution and quality to be used in 
automated biometric matching. 
EURODAC: The EURODAC system enables the comparison of fingerprints of asylum applicants and illegal 
immigrants. The Members States of the system are the 28 EU members, Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and 
Switzerland. The objective of Eurodac in the asylum process is to facilitate the application of the Dublin III 
Regulation. This Regulation provides a mechanism for determining which country is responsible for 
examining applications for international protection lodged in one of the member states. 
European Data Protection Supervisor: The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) is an independent 
institution of the EU, responsible under Article 41(2) of Regulation 45/2001 ‘With respect to the processing 
of personal data… for ensuring that the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular 
their right to privacy, are respected by the Community institutions and bodies’, and ‘…for advising 
Community institutions and bodies and data subjects on all matters concerning the processing of personal 
data’. Under Article 28(2) of Regulation 45/2001, the Commission is required, ‘when adopting a legislative 
Proposal relating to the protection of individuals’ rights and freedoms with regard to the processing of 
personal data...’, to consult the EDPS.  
Entry-Exit System: the Entry/Exit System (EES) is a system to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry 
data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union 
and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes.  
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR): On 4 May 2016, the official text of the Regulation has been 
published in the EU Official Journal in all the official languages. The Regulation will enter into force on 24 May 
2016. The objective of this new set of rules is to give citizens back control over of their personal data, and to 
simplify the regulatory environment for business. The data protection reform is a key enabler of the Digital 
Single Market which the Commission has prioritized. The reform will allow European citizens and businesses 
to fully benefit from the digital economy. 
Multi-modal biometrics: They can be defined as the combination of different biometric technologies to 
enhance the accuracy or performance of the system (it is also called multilevel biometrics). Biometric systems 
use two or more biometric traits / modalities from the same individual in the matching process. These 
systems can work in different ways, either collecting different biometrics with different sensors or by 
collecting multiple units of the same biometric. 
Personal data: Article 4(1) of the GDPR defines “personal data” as any information relating to an identified 
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.  
Processing:  Article 4(14) of the GDPR defines “processing” as any operation or set of operations which is 
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction. 
Schengen Area: The Schengen Area is one of the greatest achievements of the EU. It is an area without 
internal borders, an area within which citizens, many non-EU nationals, business people and tourists can 
freely circulate without being subjected to border checks. Since 1985, it has gradually grown and 
encompasses today almost all EU States and a few associated non-EU countries. While having abolished their 
internal borders, Schengen States have also tightened controls at their common external border on the basis 
of Schengen rules to ensure the security of those living or travelling in the Schengen Area. 
Schengen Border Code: The Schengen Borders Code governs the crossing of the external border, facilitating 
access for those who have a legitimate interest to enter into the EU. A special Local Border Traffic Regime 
PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 Deliverable D2.2 
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has also been established to facilitate entry for non-EU border residents who frequently need to cross the 
EU external border. A common visa policy further facilitates the entry of legal visitors into the EU. 
Sensitive personal data: Article 9(1) of the GDPR defines “sensitive personal” data as personal data revealing 
racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and 
the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data 
concerning health or data concerning a natural person's sex life or sexual orientation. 
Schengen Information System: The Schengen Information System (SIS) is a large-scale information system 
that supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation in the Schengen States. The SIS 
enables competent authorities, such as police and border guards, to enter and consult alerts on certain 
categories of wanted or missing persons and objects. An SIS alert not only contains information about a 
particular person or object but also clear instructions on what to do when the person or object has been 
found. Specialised national SIRENE Bureaux serve as single points of contact for any supplementary 
information exchange and coordination of activities related to SIS alerts.  
Self-service system: means an automated system which performs all or some of the border checks that are 
applicable to a person. 
Visa Information System (VIS): The Visa Information System (VIS) allows Schengen States to exchange visa 
data. It consists of a central IT system and of a communication infrastructure that links this central system to 
national systems. VIS connects consulates in non-EU countries and all external border crossing points of 
Schengen States. It processes data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas to visit, or to 
transit through, the Schengen Area. The system can perform biometric matching, primarily of fingerprints, 
for identification and verification purposes. 
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1 Introduction 
The main message of this deliverable is to remind PROTECT partners that borders are the result of a human 
legal construction. Originally, the earth was a globe on which people could naturally freely walk around. 
Therefore, the general principle of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)2 is that everyone has 
the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state and the right to leave any 
country, including his own, and to return to his country.3 Hence, it has to be known that  border control 
checks have huge impacts on fundamental rights, notably on right to dignity (Article 1 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights4 of the EU, hereafter “CFR”); right to liberty and security (Article 6 CFR), respect for 
private and family life (Article 7 CFR), the protection of personal data (Article 8 CFR), right to asylum (Article 
18 CFR), protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition (Article 19 CFR), the right to non-
discrimination (Article 21 CFR), the rights of the child (Article 24 of the Charter) and the right to an effective 
remedy (Article 47 CFR). Of course, these fundamental rights are not absolute but their respect remain the 
principle and any interference with them must be carefully assessed.  
This general principle being recalled, it has to be acknowledged that the EU is facing the most severe 
migration crisis since the Second World War.5 In addition, terrorist attacks that have occurred on EU territory 
have heightened security concerns.6 These events have prompted the EU Commission to consider several 
initiatives which include the creation of new large-scale EU information systems for border control 
management7, the modification of existing ones8 as well as the interoperability of all these systems. 
                                                          
2 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a milestone document in the history of human rights. Drafted by 
representatives with different legal and cultural backgrounds from all regions of the world, the Declaration was 
proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948 (General Assembly resolution 217 
A) as a common standard of achievements for all peoples and all nations. 
3 Art. 13 UDHR. 
4 European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 26 October 2012, 2012/C 326/02. 
5 See p. 1. of the “Legislative train: 8 towards a new policy on migration” available at  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/pdfs/legislative-train-schedule-theme-towards-a-new-policy-on-
migration-12-2017.pdf 
6 EDPS, Reflection paper on the interoperability of information systems in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 17 
November 2017, p.5,  
available at https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/17-11-16_opinion_interoperability_en.pdf 
7 See for instance Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 
amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System; Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry 
and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States 
and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement purposes, and amending the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and (EU) No 1077/2011, Proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation 
System (ETIAS) and amending Regulations (EU) No 515/2014, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 2016/794 and (EU) 2016/1624, COM 
(2016) 731 final. 
8  See for instance the SIS legislative package consisting of (i) the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of 
border checks, amending Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006, COM(2016) 882 
final; (ii) the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment, operation 
and use of the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters, amending Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1986/2006, Council Decision 
2007/533/JHA and Commission Decision 2010/261/EU, COM(2016) 883 final and (iii) the Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of the Schengen Information System for the return of illegally 
staying third country nationals, COM(2016) 881 final. See also the Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on amending Regulation (EU) No 603/2013 on the establishment of Eurodac for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013] establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of 
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In this general context, it is worth mentioning that already on 19 and 20 June 2003, the European Council of 
Thessaloniki stated that “a coherent approach is needed in the European Union on biometric identifiers or 
biometric data for documents for third country nationals, European Union citizens’ passports and information 
systems”.9 
The reasons why the EU is increasingly pushing for a coherent approach of using the same biometrics in both 
travel documents and IT-systems are the following: 
 Alphanumerical data can be unreliable for establishing the identity of a person, due to many so-called 
aliases, cases of identity fraud, entry and spelling mistakes. The power of biometric data lies in their 
capacity to serve as universal identifiers allowing the same information about the same person to be 
linked across different information sources; 
 The use of the same biometric features (fingerprints and facial image) in travel documents and IT-
systems is considered to make the matching for background checks significantly more reliable. As 
Table 1 shows, this reason leads travel documents and EU border IT-systems to increasingly rely on 
fingerprints and facial image of travellers to have a coherent approach of identity-management at 
external borders crossings. 
The table below illustrates biometrics being/or planned to be stored in EU travel documents and IT-systems 
for border control. 
 
Travel document/IT system Biometrics included 
EU passport  
 




Fingerprints and facial image 
Schengen visa Not in the sticker itself but inclusion of biometrics in the VIS 
during the visa application 
 
VIS  Fingerprints, photographs (facial image in the future) 
 
SIS II (immigration control) Fingerprints (and facial image according to SIS II proposal on 
borders) 
 
EES  Fingerprints and facial image  
Table 1 - Biometric data in current travel documents and IT- border control management systems 
 
Since the goal of the “PROTECT solution” is to develop an enhanced contactless biometric-based person 
identification system at external border crossings involving the processing of “additional” biometric data 
(other than fingerprints and facial image), the main issues highlighted in this deliverable are the right to 
respect for private life (Article 7 CFR and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights10 − hereafter 
“ECHR”) and the right to the protection of personal data (Article 8 CFR).  
                                                          
the Member States by a third country national or a stateless person, for identifying an illegally staying third country 
national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' law enforcement 
authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, COM(2016)272 final. 
9 The Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council of 19 and 20 June 2003 are available at  
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11638-2003-INIT/en/pdf 
10 Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended 
by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, 4 November 1950, ETS 5. 
Deliverable D2.2 PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 
 Page 13 of 71 
 
The collection and storage of additional personal biometric data envisaged by the “PROTECT solution” clearly 
amounts to an interference with the right to private life under the CFR and the ECHR. As a reminder, the 
European Court of Human Rights (hereafter ECtHR) has held that the “mere storing of data relating to the 
private life of an individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of Article 8”.11 The subsequent 
use of the stored information has no bearing on that finding.12 Rather, the access to that data by authorities 
forms a further interference with the right to privacy.13 In terms of finding interference, it is irrelevant 
whether the information collected is sensitive or not or whether or not persons concerned have been 
inconvenienced in any way.14  
Furthermore, in S & Marper v the UK, the ECtHR held that biometric features constitute personal data 
containing “certain external identification features” which contain “unique information about the individual 
concerned [sic] allowing his or her identification [to be made] with precision in a wide range of 
circumstances”.15 Biometric features hence belong to a special category of more sensitive data.16 In relation 
to the decentralised storage of biometrics in passports, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) likewise held that 
the processing of fingerprints constituted “a threat” to the right to respect for private life and the right to 
protection of personal data, as biometrics play an important role in the field of identifying persons in 
general.17 The ECJ has also indicated that central storage of biometrics would need to comply with more 
stringent requirements than their storage in the passport itself.18  
In the same way, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)19 considers biometric data as personal data 
being sensitive.20 In the GDPR, “biometric data” are defined as “personal data resulting from specific technical 
processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which 
allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data”. 
In accordance with the GDPR definition, measures of biometric identification or their digital translation in a 
template form can always be considered as "information relating to a natural person" as it concerns data, 
which provides, by its very nature, information about a given person.21 For this reason, the processing of 
biometric data needs to carefully comply with the data protection principles enshrined in EU and national 
law.  
As the activities proposed by the “PROTECT solution” amount to an interference with the rights to private 
life and to data protection, the PROTECT scenarios described in D3.1 must fulfil the tests of legality, necessity 
and proportionality in order to be lawful. Indeed, article  8(2) ECHR sets out the grounds the State may 
interfere with the right to privacy: “There shall be no interference by a public authority with the existence of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests 
of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention or detection 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others”. 
                                                          
11 ECtHR, S. v Marper v the United Kingdom, para. 67. 
12 Amann v Switzerland [GC], no. 27798/95, ECtHR 2000-II, at para. 69, and S. and Marper v the UK. Cases C:465/00, 
C:138/01 and C:139/01, Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, EU:C:2003:294, para. 75. 
13 Leander v Sweden, ECtHR (1987), Series A, no. 116, at para. 48. Joined Cases C-293/12 (Digital Rights Ireland) and C-
594/12 (Kärtner Landesregierug), EU:C:2014:238, para. 35. 
14 Österreichischer Rundfunk and Others, EU:C:2003:294, para. 75; Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238, para. 33. 
15 ECtHR, S. & Marper v the United Kingdom, para. 84. 
16 ECtHR, S. & Marper v the United Kingdom, para. 103. 
17 ECJ, C-291/12, Schwarz v. Bochum, 17 October 2013, paras 23-30. 
18 ECJ, C-291/12, Schwarz v. Bochum, 17 October 2013, paras 59-63. 
19 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
20 On 4 May 2016, the official texts of the Regulation and the Directive have been published in the EU Official Journal. 
The GDPR entered into force on 24 May 2016, it shall apply from 25 May 2018. 
21 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, Adopted on 20th June 2007, p. 8.   
PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 Deliverable D2.2 
Page 14 of 71  
 
The ECtHR has set out three criteria which must be satisfied to ensure that any interference is in compliance 
with Art. 8(2). An interference must be:  
1. in accordance with the law,  
2. in pursuit of one of the legitimate aims set out in Art. 8(2), and 
3. necessary in a democratic society.  
For these reasons, two types of legal constraints should be taken into account by the PROTECT scenarios 
described in Deliverable D3.1:  
 Legal constraints deriving from legislation regulating EU travel documents (ePassports, residence 
permits, visas), Schengen IT systems (in particular, SIS, SLTD, API, VIS, EES and the ETIAS proposal) 
as well as legislation regulating cross-border movements at the Schengen external borders (the 
Schengen Borders Code – hereafter “SBC”); 
 Legal privacy constraints related to the purpose, collection, storage and processing of additional 
biometric data being developed in the context of the PROTECT project. These legal constraints 
are mainly regulated by article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Directive 
95/46/EC and the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 
These two types of legal constraints which should be taken into account by the PROTECT scenarios mainly 
amount to analyse whether the additional biometrics (other than fingerprints and facial image) which are 
envisaged to be processed respect the data minimisation principle enshrined in article 5(c) of the GDPR. 
According to this principle, personal data must be “adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in 
relation to the purposes for which they are processed”. 
 
1.1 Concept of PROTECT  
The potential of implementing contactless multimodal biometrics at external border crossing (PROTECT 
system) points was stated by the European Commission, which expressed it as follows in the H2020 call “BES-
6-2015: Border crossing points, topic 2: Exploring new modalities in biometric-based border checks”.22  
“Research is needed in order to explore whether it is possible to use other biometric data (potentially already 
used in another context and in another domain) than fingerprint, iris or facial picture to store in the e-Passport 
chip, which would guarantee the same or higher level of security, but would be more accurate and could be 
retrieved in a more efficient manner than in the case of the conventionally used biometric data types. In 
addition, practical experiences lead to the assumption that for non-critical travellers (EU, bona-fide etc.) a 
most fluent non-intrusive control process is desired. Therefore, to increase accuracy, in this case the use of 
contactless techniques (e.g. face, 3D face, iris) and multi-biometric fusion is likely to be preferred over contact-
based technologies”. 
The PROTECT concept has been designed in order to address these needs stated by the Commission, even 
though it is regrettable that the call considered explicitly EU passengers as being “non-critical travellers”. 
Indeed, recently, Regulation (EU) 2017/45823 reinforced checks of EU passengers at external borders to take 
into account the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters, many of whom are Union citizens. In any case, in 
the proposal, the consortium proposed to develop a multimodal biometric solution for identity confirmation 
“on the move” of travellers with the aim to facilitate the Schengen Area external cross-border movements. 
The system should, therefore, process various “emerging” biometric modalities which could be processed in 
                                                          
22 Information about the purpose of the H2020 call “BES-6-2015: Border crossing points, topic 2: Exploring new 
modalities in biometric-based border checks” is available at  
 http://ec.europa.eu/research/participants/portal/desktop/en/opportunities/h2020/topics/bes-06-2015.html 
23 Regulation (EU) 2017/458 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 amending Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders 
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a contactless-way. For the purposes of multimodal biometric ID verification, the initial plan was to include 
such biometrics as: face recognition, iris recognition, vein pattern recognition, speaker recognition as well as 
anthropometric recognition. When operational, the beneficiaries of the multimodal biometric system being 
developed within the PROTECT project should be persons enjoying the Union right of free movement as well 
as third country nationals (TCNs). The system should be deployed in Automated Border Control (ABC) areas 
supporting border guards to facilitate smooth and non-intrusive rapid crossing by travellers based on 
deployment of the next generation of biometric identification detection methods. The ability for the system 
to efficiently process “low-risk travellers” – a concept which is not defined in the DoA and which has no legal 
definition –, combined with increased levels of accuracy, security and privacy standards and enabling border 
guards to concentrate resource on “higher-risk travellers” – a concept which is also not defined in the DoA –
, are central ambitions of the project.  
Bearing these objectives and ambitions in mind, the H2020 call BES-6-2015 also specified that ethical, societal 
and data protection aspects should be integral part of the research by stating that “while the introduction of 
new biometric-based modalities in the process of person identification might lead to making this process more 
accurate and efficient, an integral part of the research should also embrace the related ethical, societal and 
data protection aspects”. 
 
1.2 PROTECT scenarios described in D3.1 
1.2.1 General overview  
Chapter 8 of “Deliverable D3.1 - System requirements specification and scenarios” (hereafter D3.1) provides 
an overview of the PROTECT demonstration and scenarios. PROTECT demonstrations have been divided into 
two types: A (air and sea border) and B (land border). Both A and B types of demonstrations are using a 
Biometric Capture Area (BCA) and testing the 1) ePassport and 2) mobile device scenario. The figure below 
represents this overall approach.  
 
Figure 1 - PROTECT scenario and demonstration hierarchy 
 
In more detail, the division of demonstration types A and B in D3.1 is the following:  
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 Type A (‘Walk-Through Border Crossing’), where individual travellers proceed on foot, with or 
without baggage, from an aircraft, ship, train, vehicle or direct to and from another country as 
pedestrians and are examined for admissibility into – or exit from –  the EU under the Schengen 
Borders Code or other relevant legislation.  
 Type B (‘Drive-Through Border Crossing’), where one or more travellers proceed inside a vehicle or 
on a wheeled conveyance through an EU external border crossing point and are examined for exit 
from – or admissibility into – the EU under the Schengen Borders Code or other relevant legislation.  
For both types A and B demonstrations, Section 8.4 of D3.1 describes in illustrated terms the enrolment and 
verification phases of the 1) ePassport and 2) mobile device scenario. 
1.2.2 Enrolment phase  
According to D3.1, the enrolment phase would only be performed once during the lifetime of the electronic 
passport. Prior to the enrolment process, each passenger interested in using the PROTECT solution would be 
required to give formal consent for data collection and will know exactly the purpose and limits of 
government use of their personal data. They would be able to withdraw consent at any time during the 
process and be satisfied that their data will be protected and deleted where necessary.  
1.2.2.1 Passport scenario 
In this scenario, a passenger (EU national or third country national) holding a 4th generation electronic 
passport eligible for the PROTECT programme who wishes to travel to (or from) a Schengen country and 
would like to use the “PROTECT” solution for the first time should register via an enrolment kiosk.  During 
the enrolment process, this passenger would undergo a background check in relevant European and national 
databases. Once this pre-verification is concluded with a positive result, the system would verify the 
electronic passport and passenger’s biometric features with the templates stored on the chip. The entire 
enrolment process would be supervised by a border guard to provide assistance and monitor whether the 
process goes as planned. The positive results of the prior step would allow the passenger for the registration 
of additional biometric features that are applied in the PROTECT solution. The anthropometric and gait 
features collection requires walking through the Biometric Capture Area. The new set of data would be saved 
at the passenger’s electronic passport.  
1.2.2.2 Mobile device scenario 
In this scenario, a passenger who wishes to use the PROTECT solution with the application of mobile device 
when travelling to (from) a Schengen country would need to install the official PROTECT app first. Once the 
passenger reaches the kiosk, the essential step is to establish a secure connection between the kiosk and the 
passenger’s mobile device. In order to establish the connection, the passenger would scan the barcode that 
appears on the kiosk’s display. Once the connection is established, the passenger would be required to scan 
the passport in order to read the data. Passport authenticity would be verified. The passenger would then be 
verified in relevant European and national databases. Following a positive verification, passenger’s existing 
biometric data stored in the passport would be verified in the kiosk. The entire enrolment process would be 
overseen by a border guard, as for the Passport scenario.  The next step would involve a proper collection of 
additional biometric features that are required by the PROTECT system. The collection of anthropometric 
and gait features requires walking through the Biometric Capture Area. Successfully enrolled and encrypted 
data would finally be transferred to the PROTECT app on passenger’s mobile application. 
1.2.3 Verification at air and sea border (type A) 
1.2.3.1 Passport scenario  
When considering the verification process, the first step would require the passenger to approach the kiosk 
in order to read the data from the new generation passport. This step is to ensure all necessary data for 
PROTECT verification are on the passport. In case additional data are required, they could be added in the 
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kiosk. The set of data read out from the electronic passport would be transmitted to the local border control 
system for the purposes of the traveller verification.  Once the data are successfully transmitted to the border 
control system, the passenger would be allowed to walk through the biometric capture area. The PROTECT 
sensor lane verifies the biometric features stored in the passport against the data collected by the PROTECT 
system. The verification is carried out while the passenger is on-the-move. The process is supervised by a 
border guard who monitors the process and handles the exceptions. Once the verification is completed with 
a positive score, the data are removed from the temporary database.  
1.2.3.2 Mobile device scenario 
The verification process with the use of passenger’s mobile device is slightly more advanced when compared 
to the passport scenario. The process begins with the traveller arriving at the destination airport or port. The 
traveller gets off the plane or disembarks the ship and heads toward the Biometric Capture Area.  Once the 
traveller is in the close vicinity of the Biometric Capture Area, the PROTECT app on the passenger’s mobile 
device processes the signals sent by the iBeacon so that the system is informed that the passenger is about 
to cross the Biometric Capture Area. Then, the PROTECT app transfers the set of encrypted passport and 
biometric data to the local border control system. The transferred data are temporarily stored in border 
control system only for traveller verification purposes in the Biometric Capture Area.  Once the passenger 
crossed the Biometric Capture Area and has been successfully verified, the data are removed from the border 
control system.  
1.2.4 Verification Process at land border crossing points (type B)  
1.2.4.1 Passport scenario 
A traveller in a vehicle approaches the land border crossing point and stops at the border control post. The 
border guard may remain in the booth. The traveller will be requested to submit the personal data to the 
border guard. This might be done via 2 methods. Either the passport data can be transmitted via traveller 
smartphone or via dedicated terminal at border crossing point. The data are transferred to the local border 
control system. Following the successful data transmission, the next step is the biometric verification 
procedure. This step is performed either by capturing all of the requested data by the sensors in the biometric 
terminal alongside and external to the vehicle or by submitting the biometric features via mobile device. 
More in-depth analysis of submitting the biometric data through mobile device is presented in Deliverable 
D6.7. The border guard is presented all the data submitted by a traveller in real-time. Following a successful 
check, the passenger data are deleted from the local border control system.  
1.2.4.2 Mobile device scenario 
The traveller in a vehicle drives towards the land border crossing point and stops at the border post. The 
border guard may remain inside the border control booth.  With the help of PROTECT app, the traveller will 
communicate with the local border control system and submit all requested biographical and biometric data. 
The application will allow the traveller to transmit additional data to the border guard if need be.  Biometric 
verification will be performed at the dedicated terminal positioned alongside and external to the vehicle, 
which will have integrated biometric sensors. An alternative method of capturing traveller biometric data is 
the use of mobile device and using the incorporated sensors for such purposes. Following a positive 
verification, the passenger might proceed his/her journey. The data are removed from the local database.  
 
1.3 Purpose of the document  
This document is Deliverable D2.2 of Task T2.2, WP2 – Privacy of the PROTECT project. The aim of D2.2 is to 
explore the current and proposed European legal framework regulating both biometric border control and 
personal data protection in order to identify the legal constraints which should be taken into account by the 
scenarios being defined in Deliverable D3.1.  
PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 Deliverable D2.2 
Page 18 of 71  
 
The main objective of the PROTECT project being to develop a contactless multimodal biometric solution for 
identity confirmation of travellers with the aim to facilitate and fasten their border crossings, it is essential 
to analyse the following main legal questions:  
1) Under current EU law, is there a possibility for electronic machine-readable documents to support 
an enhanced set of contactless biometrics? In other words, could emerging biometrics (other than 
facial image and fingerprints) be included in travel documents under current EU law?  
2) Under current EU law, could a smartphone be considered as a travel document to support traditional 
biometrics (fingerprints and facial image) as well as an enhanced set of contactless biometrics?  
 
3) Under current EU law, could consent of a traveller be the legal basis to enrol additional biometrics in 
a travel document for “government use of their personal data”24 ?  
 
4) Under current EU law, which constraints related to the entry/exit external border checks for both 
persons enjoying the EU right to free movement and TCNs should be taken into account by the 
PROTECT scenarios?  
5) Under current EU law, which constraints should be taken into account by the PROTECT scenarios 
when making use of technologies such as self-service systems, eGates and automated border control 
systems?  
 
6) Under current EU law, which checks against databases should be taken into account by the PROTECT 
scenarios and which legal constraints derive from these in relation to the development of a 
contactless solution?  
 
7) Does the PROTECT scenarios fit in with the EU’s own future border control plans, in particular the 
EC’s proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU 
information systems?  
.  
1.4 Document scope 
The document consists of an introduction and 4 main sections: 
 Section 2 presents the rules governing the format of EU travel documents and the biometric features 
included in these for the purpose of identifying the related legal constraints which should be taken 
into account by D3.1 scenarios;  
 Section 3 describes the current conditions of entry/exit to the Schengen Area of both persons 
enjoying the Union right of free movement and third country nationals for the purpose of identifying 
the related legal constraints which should be taken into account by D3.1 scenarios;  
 
 Section 4 provides for an overview of the EU databases and systems for border control management 
(SIS, VIS, EES, EURODAC, SLTD, API and ETIAS), the purposes of these and the information contained 
therein for the purpose of identifying the related legal constraints which should be taken into account 
by D3.1 scenarios; 
 
 Section 5 presents the recent EC’s proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework for 
interoperability between EU information systems, and in particular the proposed shared biometric 
matching service which is based on the two following biometric features: fingerprints and facial 
image.  
                                                          
24 “government use of their personal data” is the sentence used in p. 71.  
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2 Format of EU travel documents and biometrics included 
2.1 Introduction  
As reminded in Section 1.2, Section 8 of D3.1 provides an overview of the PROTECT demonstration and 
scenarios. 
 In the passport scenario (both types A and B), additional biometric (other than fingerprints and facial 
image) would be stored in a 4th generation electronic passport.  
 In the mobile scenario (both types A and B), additional biometric (other than fingerprints and facial 
image) would be stored in a smartphone app.       
           
2.2 Format of E-passports and biometrics included 
2.2.1 Legal requirements 
In the aftermath of the tragic events of 11 September 2001, the Commission was asked by Member States 
to take immediate action to improve document security. The Council therefore decided to integrate 
biometrics in European passports in order to strengthen the link between the passport and the carrier of the 
passport, as well as to make it easier to verify the authenticity of the passport. 
By consequence, on 13 December 2004, the EU Council adopted Regulation (EC) No 2252/200425 which 
prescribes the compulsory implementation of biometrics in EU passports. Article 1(2) of this text states that 
“Passports and travel documents shall include a highly secure storage medium which shall contain a facial 
image. Member States shall also include two fingerprints taken flat in interoperable formats. The data shall 
be secured and the storage medium shall have sufficient capacity and capability to guarantee the integrity, 
the authenticity and the confidentiality of the data”. These requirements do not apply to identity cards issued 
by Member States to their nationals or to temporary passports and travel documents having a validity of 12 
months or less.26 
The purpose of the collection and storage of biometric features in passports in indicated in article 4(3) as 
follows: “Biometric data shall be collected and stored in the storage medium of passports and travel 
documents with a view to issuing such documents. For the purpose of this Regulation the biometric features 
in passports and travel documents shall only be used for verifying: 
 the authenticity of the passport or travel document; 
 the identity of the holder by means of directly available comparable features when the passport or 
travel document is required to be produced by law”.  
Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 states that “Additional technical specifications in accordance with 
international standards, including in particular the recommendations of the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO)” shall be established relating to:  
 additional security features and requirements, including enhanced anti-forgery, counterfeiting and 
falsification standards; 
 technical specifications for the storage medium of the biometric features and their security, including 
prevention of unauthorised access; 
                                                          
25 Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued by Member States (OJ L 385, 29.12.2004, p. 1). 
26 Art. 1(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004. 
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 requirements for quality and common technical standards for the facial image and the fingerprints. 
In this context, on 28 February 2005, the Commission adopted the first part of the technical specifications 
which relate to the storage of the facial image of the holder on a contact-less chip. On 28 June 2006, the 
Commission adopted a second Decision27 relating to the additional storage of two fingerprints on the 
passport chip which was amended in 201128 and in 2013.29 In these specifications, some elements concerning 
security requirements can be found such as compliance to the BSI Technical Report on Advanced Security 
Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents30. In this BSI document a specific implementation of 
the Extended Access Control (EAC)31 security mechanism as mentioned in ICAO 9303 is given. The 
implementation of these technical specifications by Member States is mandatory and failure to fulfil these 
obligations can lead to sentences pronounced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ).32 
On 28 May 2008, Regulation EC 2252/2004 was amended by Regulation (EC) No 444/200933. The main reason 
was that Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 provided for a general obligation to provide fingerprints to be stored 
on a contactless chip in the passport or travel document. However, experience from tests showed that 
exceptions are needed. During pilot projects in some Member States it appeared that the fingerprints of 
children under the age of 6 seemed not to be of a sufficient quality for one-to-one verification of identity. 
Furthermore, children are subject to significant changes which make it difficult to check them during the 
entire period of validity of the passport or travel document. Therefore, the Regulation was amended in order 
to harmonize the exceptions to the general obligation to provide fingerprints and to maintain common 
security standards with a view to simplifying border controls. A second reason for amendment was the 
introduction of the principle of “one person-one passport”. This principle was already recommended by the 
International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) to ensure that the passport and the biometric features are 
only linked to the person holding the passport. In order to cease the revealed deficiencies, the European 
Parliament and the Council issued Regulation (EC) no 444/2009 with these essential amendments: 
 The passport and travel documents should be issued as individual documents to respect the principle 
of one person one document; 
                                                          
27 Commission Decision of 28/6/2006 laying down the technical specifications on the standards for security features and 
biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, C(2006) 2909 final. Available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=list&coteId=3&year=2006&number=2909&language=en 
28 Commission Decision C(2011) 5499https://www.pep.pt/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Decisao-da-comissao-C2011-
5499-final-de-04.08.2011-en.pdf 
29 Commission implementing Decision of 30/9/2013 amending Commission Decision C(2006) 2909 final laying down the 
technical specifications on the standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued 
by Member States and Commission Decision C(2008) 8657 laying down a certificate policy as required in the technical 
specifications on the standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by 
Member States and updating the normative reference documents, C(2013) 6181 final. Available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/documents/policies/borders-and-
visas/document-security/docs/comm_decision_c_2013_6181_en_.pdf 
30 Advanced Security Mechanisms for Machine Readable Travel Documents, BSI TR-03110 Part 1 and 3, Version 2.10 of 
20 March 2012. 
31 Extended Access Control is a mutual authentication mechanism between the terminal and the chip based on public 
key infrastructures (PKI). Terminal Authentication restricts access to data stored on the chip to authorized terminals. 
Chip Authentication not only authenticates the chip as genuine, it also enforces strong encryption and integrity 
protection of the transmitted data. 
32 ECJ, Judgment of the Court (Ninth Chamber) of 13 February 2014 — European Commission v Kingdom of Belgium, 
Case C-139/13.  
33 Regulation (EC) No 444/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 May 2009 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents 
issued by Member States.  
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 Children under the age of 12 and persons where fingerprinting is physically impossible are exempted 
from the obligation to provide fingerprints.34  
Concerning the material of the passport or travel document which must be issued in machine-readable form, 
the annex of Regulation EC 2252/200435 accepts: 
1) Paper meeting the following minimum requirements: no optical brighteners, duotone watermarks, 
security reagents to guard against attempts at tampering by chemical erasure, coloured fibres (partly 
visible and partly fluorescent under UV light, or invisible and fluorescent in at least two colours), UV-
fluorescent planchettes are recommended (mandatory for stickers), the use of security thread is 
recommended. An optically variable (OVD) or equivalent device, which provides for the same level 
of identification and security as currently used in the uniform format for visas, shall be used on the 
biographical data page and shall take the form of diffractive structures which vary when viewed from 
different angles (DOVID) incorporated into the hot-sealed or an equivalent laminate (as thin as 
possible) or applied as an OVD overlay. 
2) Stickers. In that case, the watermark in the paper used for that page may be dispensed with. The 
watermark may also be dispensed with in the paper used for the inside of the passport or travel 
document covers. Security reagents are required on the inside covers only if data are entered there. 
Stitching thread should be protected against substitution. If stickers or non-laminated paper inside 
pages are used for biographical data, intaglio printing with latent image effect, microtext and ink with 
optically variable properties and a DOVID (diffractive optically variable image device) shall also be 
employed.  
 
3) Cards made entirely of a synthetic substrate. In such cards, it is not usually possible to incorporate 
the authentication marks used in passport or travel document paper. In the case of cards, the lack of 
marks in the materials shall be compensated for by measures in respect of security printing, use of 
an anti-copying device, or an issuing technique according to sections 3, 4 and 5 of the 
aforementioned annex. These include additional optically variable security devices shall, at least 
through the use of a DOVID or equivalent measures. If a synthetic card is personalised by laser 
engraving, and an optically variable laser written device is incorporated therein, the diffractive OVD 
shall be applied at least in the form of a positioned metallised or transparent DOVID, to achieve 
enhanced protection against reproduction. 
In short, currently, at European level, ePassports which format is strictly regulated, must contain the 
following biometrics modalities in a mandatory manner:  
 Facial image  
 Two fingerprints (left and right index finger36) taken flat. 
 
2.2.2 Privacy considerations 
On 18 August 2004, the Chairman of the Article 29 Working Party addressed a letter to the President of the 
European Parliament, the President of the LIBE Committee, the Secretary General of the Council of the 
                                                          
34 Where fingerprinting of the designated fingers is temporarily impossible, Member States shall allow the fingerprinting 
of the other fingers. Where it is also temporarily impossible to take fingerprints of any of the other fingers, they may 
issue a temporary passport having a validity of 12 months or less.  
35 The annex of Regulation EC 2252/2004 is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32004R2252 
36 For each hand, if the index finger is injured or missing, or has an ISO/IEC 19794-4 score of 0 to 25, a plain impression 
of the middle finger, ring finger or thumb of the same hand shall be recorded where a higher ISO score is available. If all 
fingers on one hand are of the low quality score indicated above, a plain impression of the finger with the best score 
shall be taken. 
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European Union, the President of the European Commission, the Director General of DG Enterprise and the 
Director General of DG Justice and Home Affairs.37 Amongst others, he pointed the following: 
1. The Working Party strictly opposes the storage of all EU passport holders´ biometric and other data 
in a centralised database of European passports and travel documents; 
2. The purpose of introducing biometric features in passports and travel documents as defined by the 
Regulation has to be explicit, appropriate, proportionate and clear; 
3. The Member States should guarantee in a technically sound way that the passports include a storage 
medium with sufficient capacity and the capability to guarantee the integrity, the authenticity and 
the confidentiality of the data; 
4. The Regulation should define who may have access to the storage medium and for which purposes 
(reading, storing, modifying or erasing data); 
5. The Member States should set up a register of competent authorities. 
In a further letter of 30 November 2004 addressed to the President of the LIBE Committee and to the 
President of the Council of the European Union, the Chairman of the Article 29 Working Party argued against 
a second mandatory biometric feature. The Chairman stressed that the introduction of an additional 
biometric feature makes it all the more necessary to create a secure and waterproof system making sure that 
the fundamental right of privacy is not endangered. 
On 16 September 2005, the 27th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners in 
Montreux adopted the Resolution on the use of biometrics in passports, identity cards and travel 
documents.38 In this Resolution the International Conference is pointing out that the widespread use of 
biometrics will have a far-reaching impact on the global society and therefore should be subject to an open 
worldwide debate. The International Conference is calling for: 
1. effective safeguards to be implemented at an early stage to limit the risks inherent to the nature of 
biometrics; 
2. the strict distinction between biometric data collected and stored for public purposes (e.g. border 
control) on the basis of legal obligations and for contractual purposes on the basis of consent; 
3. the technical restriction of the use of biometrics in passports and identity cards to verification 
purposes comparing the data in the document with the data provided by the holder when presenting 
the document. 
In September 2005, the Article 29 Working Party issued an opinion39 on Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004. In 
this opinion, WP29 recalled that the European Parliament’s legislative resolution of 2 December 200440, 
which was adopted by 471 votes in favour to 118 against and 6 abstentions, rejected the mandatory inclusion 
of fingerprints and the creation of a central database of EU passports and travel documents. By consequence, 
fearing that privacy and data protection rights could be infringed by increasing “the risk of abuse and function 
creep” and that the scheme would “violate the purpose and the principle of proportionality” the Parliament, 
introduced an amendment to the Regulation text specifically stipulating that “no central database of 
European Union passports and travel documents containing all EU passport holders' biometric and other data 
                                                          
37 Letter of the Chairman of the Art. 29 Working Party to the President of the European Parliament, the President of the 
LIBE Committee, the Secretary General of the Council of the European Union, the President of the European 
Commission, the Director General of DG Enterprise and the Director General of DG Justice and Home Affairs, dated the 
18 August 2004 (not published). 
38 https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/05-09-16_resolution_biometrics_en.pdf 
39 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 3/2005 on Implementing the Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 
2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States, 
WP112, adopted on 30 September 2005.  
40 European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation on standards for security features 
and biometrics in EU citizens' passports (COM(2004)0116 — C5-0101/2004 — 2004/0039(CNS)) 
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shall be set up”. In the same way, according to the report of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs of 25 October 2004, "the setting up of a centralised database would violate the purpose and 
the principle of proportionality. It would also increase the risk of abuse and function creep. Finally, it would 
increase the risk of using biometric identifiers as 'access key' to various databases, thereby interconnecting 
data sets”.41 In its opinion, the Working Party supported this demand and stated that “the objection against 
a European central database of European Union passports and travel documents are the same objections 
against national central databases of passports and travel documents as well as against central databases 
for ID-cards”. However, the Council did not take account of the suggestions and requests of change laid down 
by the Parliament. According to an in-depth survey42conducted by the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party at the request of the LIBE committee of the European Parliament and focused on the implementing 
practices as regards as Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004, several Member States have foreseen the 
implementation of a central database for storing the biometric data of the passport. Although it is possible 
for the Member States to implement only a verification procedure of biometric data using a centralised 
database, as it is strictly limited to in the Regulation, this option presents additional risks regarding the 
protection of personal data, such as the development of further purposes not foreseen in the regulation, or 
even fishing expeditions into the database which will be difficult to mitigate.43  
In August 2008, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) issued an opinion44 on the proposal for a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004. 
Firstly, the EDPS regretted that the Commission did not comply with its legal obligation to consult him. 
Secondly, the EDPS regretted that the Commission did not conduct an impact assessment on this proposal: 
“It is unclear therefore how the Commission was in a position to properly evaluate necessity and 
proportionality of the proposal in relation to data protection issues without the support of a rigorous impact 
assessment”. Thirdly, the EDPS recommended the Commission to propose further harmonisation measures 
in order to implement only the use of decentralised storage (in the wireless chip of the passport) regarding 
biometric data collected for EU Member States' passports. Furthermore, according to the EDPS, the age limit 
for children in giving fingerprints should be defined by a consistent and in-depth study which is to identify 
properly the accuracy of the systems obtained under real conditions, and which is to reflect the diversity of 
the data processed. The pilot projects as such do not provide sufficient information on which fundamental 
choices of the legislator can be based. An age limit for elderly, which can be based on similar experiences 
should be introduced as an additional exemption. Such exemptions should in no case stigmatize or 
discriminate the individuals concerned. 
The EDPS also raised some remarks concerning the Commission's Decision C(2006) 2909 which defined only 
the format and the quality of the fingerprint images which should be processed as well as the way in which 
they have to be protected (Extended Access Control). There is no indication in the proposal either on the 
possible Failure to Enrol Rate (FER) and the rates related to the matching process. The proposal has indeed 
foreseen a fallback procedure for young children (age limit), but the threshold which indicates when 
fingerprints are not good enough for being enrolled is not defined. According to the EDPS, regarding the 
                                                          
41 Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, Report on the Commission proposal for a Council regulation 
on standards for security features and biometrics in EU citizens' passports, 28 October 2004.  
(COM(2004)0116 – C5-0101/2004 – 2004/0039(CNS)) 
42 See letter of 10 December 2007, with annex, from the Chairman of the Article 29 Working Party to the Chairman of 






43 See the Article 29 Working Party's opinion No 3/2005 of 30 September 2005 (WP 112). 
44 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in 
passports and travel documents issued by Member States 
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matching process, the proposal failed also to define which False Rejection Rate (FRR) should be applied at 
the border and how to deal with persons who have been apparently falsely rejected. This lack of uniform 
rates could lead to different processes of biometric data of EU citizens, depending on the border the person 
would select for entering the Schengen area, and could thus result in a lack of equal treatment of European 
citizens regarding the residual risk of biometric systems. Because the process is a one to one verification, the 
EDPS recognises that the FRR will be lower than the one applied for an identification process and there will 
therefore be fewer cases to deal with. However, fallback procedures need also to be defined in a harmonised 
and satisfactory way for those persons. Therefore, the EDPS recommends the Commission to propose 
common rates for the enrolment and matching process completed by fallback procedures together with the 
Member States' authorities. 
 
2.2.3 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, several constraints derived from current EU rules on ePassports should 
be taken into account:  
1) It is important to note that Article 4 of Regulation EC 2252/2004 stipulates that “No information in 
machine-readable form shall be included in a passport or travel document unless provided for in this 
Regulation, or its Annex, or unless it is mentioned in the passport or travel document by the issuing 
Member State in accordance with its national legislation”. To be pragmatic, this means that under the 
current EU Regulation, it is very unlikely that inclusion of additional multimodal biometrics features 
(being not facial image or fingerprints) developed within the PROTECT project could legally be integrated 
in ePassports without a national legislation of a Member State allowing it. Furthermore, even if a national 
law would allow such integration of additional biometrics, it would certainly be challenged in Court for 
privacy reasons (proportionality principle) described in Section 2.2.2.  
2) In order to comply with European privacy recommendations of the EDPS, no central database of 
European Union passports and travel documents containing all EU passport holders' biometric and other 
data should be set up.  
3) Under current EU law, it also seems very doubtful that mobile devices such as smartphones could legally 
be used as carriers of biometrics features as means to replace the materials imposed by the annex of 
Regulation EC 2252/2004: smartphones cannot be considered as “Passports or travel documents” in the 
meaning of article 1 of said Regulation. Nonetheless, this constraint does not oppose to carefully 
examining the possibility of using a smartphone as a “passport companion” on which additional 
multimodal biometric features would be stored for “comfort and convenience purposes” of travellers on 
basis of their consent. This scenario and its data protection implications will be examined in Deliverable 
D2.3- Privacy impact of next-generation biometric border control.  
 
2.3 Format residence permits and biometrics included 
2.3.1 Legal requirements  
Article 4a of Regulation (EC) No 380/200845 integrates biometric identifiers into residence permits which 
much conform to a uniform format.46 This article reads as follows:  
                                                          
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 380/2008 of 18 April 2008 amending Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 laying down a uniform 
format for residence permits for third-country nationals 
46 Article 2 of this Regulation defines "residence permit" as “any authorisation issued by the authorities of a Member 
State allowing a third-country national to stay legally on its territory, with the exception of: (i) visas; (ii) permits issued 
pending examination of an application for a residence permit or for asylum; (iii) authorisations issued for a stay of a 
duration not exceeding six months by Member States not applying the provisions of Article 21 of the Convention 
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“The uniform format for residence permits shall include a storage medium containing the facial image and 
two fingerprint images of the holder, both in interoperable formats. The data shall be secured and the storage 
medium shall be of sufficient capacity and capability to guarantee the integrity, authenticity and 
confidentiality of the data.” 
These biometric features in residence permits may only be used for verifying: 
a) the authenticity of the document; 
b) the identity of the holder by means of directly available comparable features when the residence 
permit is required to be produced by national legislation. 
The capture of fingerprints is compulsory as of six years of age. Persons for whom fingerprinting is physically 
impossible are exempted from the requirement to give fingerprints. 
Furthermore, this Regulation provides that the procedure for taking these identifiers must respect national 
legislation and the safeguards contained in the UN human rights and child conventions and that the data 
from the biometric identifiers must be stored and secured so that their integrity, authenticity and 
confidentiality are guaranteed. The technical specifications for the capture of biometric identifiers must be 
set out in accordance with ICAO standards and the technical specifications for passports issued by Member 
States to their nationals pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004.  
Furthermore, Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 as amended by47 establishes a uniform format for residence 
permits which must be stand-alone documents in card form (initially they could also be stickers attached to 
another official paper) in ID 1 format. The specifications set out in the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) document on machine-readable travel documents (Document 9303, seventh edition, 2015) should be 
taken into account.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Front and reverse of the residence permit 
 
                                                          
implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic 
Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common 
borders”. 
47 Regulation (EU) 2017/1954 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2017 amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals 
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In brief, currently, at European level, resident permits of third-country nationals must contain the following 
biometrics modalities in a mandatory manner48: 
 Facial image; 
 Two fingerprints taken flat and digitally captured. 
 
2.3.2 Privacy considerations  
On 11 August 2004, the Article 29 Working Party issued an opinion related the inclusion of biometrics in 
residence permits.49 In this opinion, the Working Party understands the concern about combating “identity 
theft”, which has most unfortunate consequences for the victims. However, in accordance with the points 
made in its working document on biometrics adopted on 1 August 200350, if biometric features are included 
in residence permits and the corresponding personal data is processed, “a number of principles would have 
to be observed with a view to protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons, particularly as 
regards their rights concerning processing of their personal data. Respect of these principles is particularly 
essential in connection with the processing of biometric data which, by their very nature, provide information 
on specific persons, especially as some can leave traces in people’s everyday lives, without the people in 
question knowing that they can be collected (digital fingerprints are a notable example”). The Working Party 
also thinks that there must be: 
 measures enabling the persons concerned to have access to the data on the chip, if only to be able 
to check the contents particularly as regards their own biometric characteristics; 
 guarantees for persons who cannot provide some of the biometric data used, such as fingerprints 
(for example, if they have lost fingers, or their fingerprints have been damaged); 
 guarantees, particularly in the event of false rejections in border checks, that the persons in question 
will be informed of the reasons for the rejection and the means by which they may assert their own 
point of view before any decision is taken and that the facts will be clarified without delay. 
Furthermore, the Working Party stresses that the interoperability provided for in Article 4a of the Regulation 
would permit access to data stored on the chip in the form of images by an authority other than the one that 
entered the data. Given that the proposed medium is a contactless chip, the Working Party would have liked 
to receive, at an appropriate time before decisions are made to adopt the Regulation, a document 
demonstrating that the specifications envisaged for the incorporation of data in chips and access to these 
data ensure that:  
 the data cannot be modified by an authority other than the one responsible for issuing the document 
in accordance with ICAO Recommendation 9303, as referred to in Recital 2 (electronic signature 
certified by the ICAO);  
 the data cannot be accessed without the persons concerned being aware of it, by public bodies other 
than those legally authorised or by private entities; it would be appropriate to provide for encryption 
of the data in order to ensure confidentiality; access for reading the electronic elements could also 
be protected by an individual code known only to the holder;  
 authorities with the right to access the data have access only to the information necessary for them 
to perform the tasks for which they are responsible. 
                                                          
48 Article 4a of Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 380/2008.  
49 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion No 7/2004 on the inclusion of biometric elements in residence permits and visas 
taking account of the establishment of the European information system on visas (VIS).  
50 Article 29 Working Party, WP 80, adopted 1 August 2003. 
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On 28 December 2006, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) also issued an opinion on the 
inclusion of biometrics in residence permits.51 In this opinion, the EDPS recognises the advantages of the use 
of biometrics but stresses the major impact of the use of such data and suggests the insertion of stringent 
safeguards for any kinds of use of biometric data. Firstly, as the residence permit is not a travel document, 
EDPS emphasize that there is no consistent reason for following the ICAO standards and therefore to use a 
contact-less chip. This technology has not been proven to be safer than a contact chip and will only bring 
additional risks to the deployment of the residence permits. ICAO standards should also be replaced by high 
security specifications corresponding to the situations under which a residence permit is used. 
Furthermore, the EDPS makes the following remarks concerning the insertion of an additional chip for e-
services purposes. According to Article 4, the Member States could embed a second chip in the stand-alone 
card of the residence permit. This second chip would be a contact chip and be dedicated to e-services. The 
EDPS specifically stresses the inadequacy of such measure since it does not respect basic and elementary 
rules of security policy required for sensitive data. This additional chip offers a full range of new applications 
and purposes for the residence permit card. The structure of the security protection profile of the first 
contactless chip which will store biometric features can only be rigorously and properly defined in the light 
of the risks produced by the other purposes such as e-business and e-government applications. There is no 
guarantee indeed that these applications will not take place for example in a relatively unsafe environment 
for the contactless chip. It would indeed be unfortunate if the use of this additional chip jeopardizes the 
security of the sensitive data stored in the primary chip. For those reasons, the EDPS strongly recommends 
following elements to be defined: 
 a limited list of purposes envisaged for the additional chip:  
 a list of data which will be stored in the additional chip; 
 the need for an impact assessment and a risk assessment of the co-existence of the two chips on the 
same stand-alone card.  
 
2.3.3 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, several constraints derived from current EU rules on residence permits 
should be taken into account:  
1) It is important to note that article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 
380/2008 provides that “No information in machine-readable form shall be included on the resident 
permit or on the storage medium of the residence permit referred to in Article 4a, unless provided for in 
this Regulation, or its Annex or unless it is mentioned in the related travel document by the issuing State 
in accordance with its national legislation”. To be pragmatic, this means that under the current EU 
Regulation, it is very unlikely that inclusion of additional multimodal biometrics features (being not facial 
image or fingerprints) developed within the PROTECT project could legally be integrated in residence 
permits without a national legislation of a Member State allowing it. Furthermore, even if a national law 
would allow such integration of additional biometrics, it would certainly be challenged in Court for 
privacy reasons (proportionality principle) described in Section 2.2.2. 
2) Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 as amended by Regulation (EC) No 380/2008 also provides 
“that Member States may also store data for e-services such as e-government and e-business as well as 
additional provisions relating to the residence permit on a chip referred to in point 16 of the Annex. 
However, all national data must be logically separated from the biometric data referred to in Article 4a”. 
Point 16 of the annex clarifies that “a RF chip shall be used as a storage medium in accordance with Article 
4a. Member States may store data on this chip or incorporate in the residence permit a dual interface or 
                                                          
51 Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on the modified proposal for a Council Regulation amending 
Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country nationals, 2006/C 
320/10.  
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a separate contact chip for national use which shall be placed at the back of the card complying with ISO 
standards and shall in no way interfere with the RF chip”. The possibility to rely on this legal basis in order 
to integrate additional “contactless” biometrics data on a “second” chip of residence permits for 
“comfort and convenience purposes” of travellers seems to be not possible since that this second chip 
should be a contact chip.  
4) Under current EU law, article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 stipulates that “residence permits issued 
by Member States to third-country nationals shall be drawn up in a uniform format and provide sufficient 
space for the information set out in the Annex hereto”. The said annex does not list mobile devices such 
as smartphones as material which can be used as carriers of biometric features for the purposes of a 
resident permit. Nonetheless, this constraint does not oppose to carefully examining the possibility of 
using a smartphone as a “travel document companion” on which additional multimodal biometric 
features would be stored for “comfort and convenience purposes” of travellers on basis of their consent. 
This scenario will be examined in D2.3- Privacy impact of next-generation biometric border control.  
 
2.4 Format of Schengen visas and absence of biometrics  
2.4.1 Legal requirements  
Council Regulation (EC) 539/2001 of 15 March 2001 lists the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement.52  
In 1995, Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/9553 created a uniform format for an EU visa taking the form of a 
sticker54 to be affixed to the travel document of non-EU nationals under visa obligation.  
This regulation lays down the rules for the uniform format for visas, not only for the Schengen countries but 
also for Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
The uniform format applies to55: 
 an intended stay in one or more countries of the Schengen area of no more than 3 months in total; 
 a transit through the international transit areas of airports of the Schengen countries (‘airport transit 
visa’). 
In the case of the Schengen countries, a short-stay visa issued by one of them entitles its holder to travel 
throughout the 26 countries for up to 90 days in any 180-day period. Visas for visits exceeding that period 
remain subject to national procedures (i.e. to allow its holder to take up employment or establish a business, 
trade or profession). 
Information on the visa sticker is the following:  
 The uniform visa sticker specifies the number of days that a non-national of an EU country may stay 
in the Schengen area and in Ireland and the United Kingdom. In the case of a Schengen visa, the days 
should be counted from the date he or she enters the Schengen area to the date he or she exits the 
Schengen area, both days included. 
                                                          
52 A consolidated version of Regulation (EC) 539/2001 for documentation purposes only is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02001R0539-20170611 
53 Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 of 29 May 1995 laying down a uniform format for visas. Subsequent amendments 
to Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 have been incorporated into the basic text. A consolidated version with documentary 
value only is available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:01995R1683-20131018 
54 Art. 1. of Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 as amended. 
55 Article 2(2)(a) of Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 
establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code) 
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 The precise length of validity of the visa is indicated on the visa sticker under the heading ‘Duration 
of visit’. 
The uniform visa must conform to: 
 a list of technical specifications56 specified in the EU legislation that lay down universally recognisable 
security features clearly visible to the naked eye57; 
 other technical specifications which aim to prevent counterfeiting and falsification of the visa and 
provide methods to fill in the visa. 
The figure below illustrates the model which must be inserted58:  
 
Figure 3 - Schengen Visa model 
At the end of September 2003, the European Commission submitted a draft Council Regulation amending 
Regulation 1683/95.59 The amendment to the uniform formats for visas proposed to include, as obligatory 
elements, two items of biometric data stored on a highly secure medium (contactless chip), i.e. a full-face 
digital photograph of the holder as the principal element for biometric identification together with two digital 
images of the holder’s fingerprints taken flat. However, a report60 sent to the Council in 2004 concluded that: 
"the solution envisaged by the draft regulation is not technically feasible". The main reason consisted in the 
so called “collision” problem, which leads to difficulties for the reader to read out the valid visa in case there 
are several contactless chips on different visa in the same passport. The reading of the valid chip in the visa 
would require difficult handling procedures. In that report, collision is described as: "the interference 
between various chips and the reading device, eg: due to the de-tuning of the resonance frequency, resulting 
in malfunction". The "collision problem" is twofold: first there is a "risk of failure due to interference between 
eVisa chips (if several states have inserted chip visas) and second, there is even the risk of failure due to 
interference between ePassport and eVisa. As the report puts it, if non-EU countries use "ePassports" and 
each visa has a biometric chip this: "Will "kill" ePassport chip functionality".  
                                                          
56 Art.2. of Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 as amended. 
57 See Annex of Council Regulation (EC) No 1683/95 as amended.  
58 For an overview of the information to which refer the references in the figure 8, see Annex of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1683/95.  
59 Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) 1683/95 laying down a uniform format for visas, Brussels, 
24.09.2003, COM(2003)558 final.  
60 Chairman of the Committee created by Article 6 of Regulation 1683/95 laying down a uniform format for visas,  
Technical feasibility of the integration of biometric identifiers into the uniform format for visa and residence permits for 
third country nationals, passports and other travel documents issued by Member States, Brussels, 11 November 2004, 
doc no: 14534/04, available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/dec/bio-visas.pdf 
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For these reasons, the visa stickers do not contain any biometric traits. However, once an application is 
found admissible as set out in the Visa Code, the visa authority creates the application file by entering data 
into the Visa Information System (VIS) such as the applicant’s personal and travel details provided in the 
application form, photograph and fingerprints. Indeed, article 13 of the Visa Code61 require Member States 
to collect the following biometric identifiers from applicants in order to enter those information in the (VIS):  
 a photograph, scanned or taken at the time of application, and 
 10 fingerprints taken flat and collected digitally. 
The collection and processing of biometric identifiers within the VIS are detailed in Section 4.3. 
 
2.4.2 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, a major constraint derived from current EU rules on Schengen visas 
should be taken into account:  
No biometric features are included in Schengen visas. The consequence is that verification of the identity of 
the holder of the visa and of the authenticity of the visa currently is done by consulting the Visa Information 
System (VIS) using the visa number and the fingerprint of the traveller (see Section 4.3). The fact that TCNVHs 
could be required to provide their fingerprints at the entry of the Schengen Area on request of border guards 
should be taken into account when developing a complete contactless biometric-based cross-border control 
solution. The use the facial image for biometric matching against the VIS has not yet been implemented. This 
issue could be resolved once the EES will become functional and that TCNVHs would be able to pre-enrol 
their facial image into that system.  
 
2.5 Is consent of travellers a legitimate basis of lawfulness for processing 
additional biometrics in travel documents?  
2.5.1 Introduction  
According to D3.1, “the enrolment phase would only be done once during the lifetime of the electronic 
passport. Prior to enrolment process, each passenger interested in using PROTECT solution would be required 
to give formal consent for data collection and will know exactly the purpose and limits of government use of 
their personal data. They would be able to withdraw consent at any time during the process and be satisfied 
that their data will be protected and deleted where necessary”. 
This section aims to answer the following legal question: under current EU law, could consent of a traveller 
be the legal basis to enrol additional biometrics in travel documents for “government use of their personal 
data”? 
2.5.2 Legal analysis 
The GDPR62 lays down rules relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and rules relating to the free movement of personal data. Article 4(14) of the GDPR defines 
“biometric data” as “personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical, 
physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the unique 
                                                          
61 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community 
Code on Visas (Visa Code). 
62 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) 
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identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopic data”. In its Opinion 4/200763, the 
Article 29 Working Party specified that biometric data are “biological properties, behavioural aspects, 
physiological characteristics, living traits or repeatable actions where those features and/or actions are both 
unique to that individual and measurable, even if the patterns used in practice to technically measure them 
involve a certain degree of probability.” By consequence, biometric data (raw and templates) are considered 
as “sensitive data” under the GDPR. As stated by article 9(1) of the GDPR, the principle is that “processing 
biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person […] shall be prohibited”. Exceptions to 
that principle are listed in article 9(2) of the GDPR. Amongst others, processing of biometric data is possible 
only if “the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for one or more 
specified purposes, except where Union or Member State law provide that the prohibition may not be lifted 
by the data subject”.  
“Consent” is defined in art. 4(11) of the GDPR as “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous 
indication of the data subject's wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, 
signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her”. Additionally, for biometric 
data, consent must be “explicit”. Furthermore, according to article 7 the GDPR, conditions for consent are 
the following:  
“1.   Where processing is based on consent, the controller shall be able to demonstrate that the data subject 
has consented to processing of his or her personal data. 2.   If the data subject's consent is given in the context 
of a written declaration which also concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a 
manner which is clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form, 
using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an infringement of this 
Regulation shall not be binding. 3.   The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at 
any time. The withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before its 
withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall be as easy to withdraw 
as to give consent. 4.   When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of 
whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional on 
consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of that contract”.  
Moreover, it should be emphasised that Recital 43 expressly states that: “in order to ensure that consent is 
freely given, consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific 
case where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the 
controller is a public authority and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the circumstances 
of that specific situation”. This means that consent of travellers could not be used by public border control 
authorities to process additional biometrics for the purpose to speed up their public interest missions.  
2.5.3 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
Recital 43 of the GDPR expressly states that: “in order to ensure that consent is freely given, consent should 
not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case where there is a clear 
imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the controller is a public authority 
and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the circumstances of that specific situation”. It 
is also clear in most cases that the data subject will have no realistic alternatives to accepting the processing 
(terms) of this controller. WP2964 considers that there are other lawful bases that are, in principle, more 
appropriate to the activity of public authorities, notably paragraphs (1c) and (1e) of article 6 GDPR.  
This means that it seems that consent of travellers cannot be considered as a legitimate basis of lawfulness 
in PROTECT scenarios to allow public border control authorities to speed up their public interest missions by 
enrolling additional biometrics in travel documents.  
This being said: 
                                                          
63 Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007 on the concept of personal data, WP 136, adopted on 20th June 2007.  
64 Article 29 Working Party, Guidelines on Consent under Regulation 2016/679, WP259, Adopted on 28 November 2017.  
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 Consent could still be a possible legal basis for “commercial” purposes. For example, in a 2005 
deliberation, the CNIL (French DPA) authorized the use of fingerprints on a fidelity chipcard (not a 
travel document) for frequent travellers of the airport of Nice. The system was designed for 
convenience purposes (facilitate access to parking zones, additional services, etc): Important criteria 
were the 1) the voluntary use, and 2) the storage on an object (no centralized database).65 
 The possibility to use consent of travellers for enrolling additional biometric features in a “passport 
companion” such as a smartphone for “comfort and convenience purposes” of travellers on basis of 
their consent will be examined in Deliverable D2.3- Privacy impact of next-generation biometric 
border control.  
 
3 Conditions of entry/exit to the Schengen Area 
Both in the A (air and sea border) and B (land border) types of demonstrations described in Chapter 8 of 
“D3.1 - System requirements specification and scenarios” (hereafter D3.1), “background checks” are 
performed on passengers willing to use the “PROTECT” solution.  
In order to assess which “background checks” should be performed by the PROTECT system at the entry/exit 
of Schengen external crossing points it is essential to identify the legal constraints derived the EU legal 
framework regulating movements at the external borders. Therefore, this section is dedicated to the analysis 
of the conditions of entry/exit to the Schengen area of persons enjoying the Union right of free movement, 
at the one hand, and third country nationals, on the other.  
The Lisbon Treaty66 attaches great importance to the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice 
(AFSJ). The legal basis of the AFSJ lies in Article 3(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) which reads as 
follows: “The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, 
in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to 
external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime”. The Schengen 
area, an area of free movement without internal borders that now covers most of Europe, is one of the 
greatest achievements of the EU with regard to the AFSJ.  
Within the Schengen Area, people may freely move from one country to another without being subjected to 
passport controls. The Schengen area was initiated in 1985, when five EU Member States67 signed the 
Schengen Agreement, thus marking the beginning of cooperation to dismantle controls at their internal 
borders.68 In subsequent years, most EU Member States, along with a few non-EU countries, joined this 
cooperation (see Figure  4).69 This means that the countries that are part of Schengen cooperation no longer 
                                                          
65 CNIL, 26ème rapport d’activité, 2005, p.50.  
66 The Treaty of Lisbon is an international agreement which amends the two treaties which form the constitutional basis 
of the European Union (EU). The Treaty of Lisbon was signed by the EU member states on 13 December 2007, and 
entered into force on 1 December 2009. It amends the Maastricht Treaty (1993), known in updated form as the Treaty 
on European Union (2007) or TEU, and the Treaty of Rome (1957), known in updated form as the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (2007) or TFEU. It also amends the attached treaty protocols as well as the Treaty 
establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). 
67 The first Member States were Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 
68 If there is a serious threat to public policy or internal security, a Schengen country may exceptionally temporarily 
reintroduce border control at its internal borders for, in principle, a limited period of no more than thirty days. The 
reintroduction of border control at the internal borders must remain an exception and must respect the principle of 
proportionality. Reintroducing border control at the internal border should only ever be used as a measure of last resort. 
If such controls are reintroduced, the other Schengen countries, the European Parliament and the Commission should 
be informed, as should the public. 
69 Now there are 26 Schengen countries - 22 EU members and four non-EU. Those four are Iceland and Norway (since 
2001), Switzerland (since 2008) and Liechtenstein (since 2011). Only six of the 28 EU member states are outside the 
Schengen zone - Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the UK. 
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carry out border checks at the borders they share with each other. The removal of internal borders means 
that the Schengen countries need to cooperate with each other to maintain a high level of security within 
the Schengen area. It also means that they need to share responsibility for and cooperate in managing their 
common external borders and should, in that context, establish good cooperation with their non-Schengen 
neighbours outside the EU. Schengen cooperation entails common criteria for controlling the external 
borders, common rules for entering/exiting the Schengen area and increased police cooperation between 
the participating countries. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Map of the Schengen area and the Schengen States 
 
Regulation (EU) 2016/39970, also known as the Schengen Border Code (hereafter “SBC”) governs the 
movement of persons across the external Schengen borders. In order to guide border guards in respect of 
the measures and decisions to be taken along the external borders, the EU commission adopted a “Practical 
Handbook for Border Guards” (hereafter “Schengen handbook”) in 2006 which was amended several times 
until 2015. 71   
                                                          
70 Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 March 2016 on a Union Code on the 
rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) as amended by Regulation (EU) 
2017/458 and by Regulation (EU) 2017/2225.  
71 However please note that this handbook does not cover the modifications of the SBC introduced by Regulation (EU) 
2017/458 and by Regulation (EU) 2017/2225. See Commission Recommendation establishing a common "Practical 
Handbook for Border Guards (Schengen Handbook)" to be used by Member States' competent authorities when 
carrying out the border control of persons, Brussels, 06/11/2006, C (2006) 5186 final. A consolidated version taking into 
account the amendments adopted by the Commission on 25 June 2008 (C (2008)2976 final), on 29 September 2009 (C 
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According to the SBC, persons enjoying the Union right of free movement, at the one hand, and third country 
nationals (hereafter “TCNs”), on the other, are subject to different border control checks. Members of the 
first group are subject only to a “minimum check” while members of the second to a more thorough one. 
 
3.1 Systematic checks on persons enjoying the Union right of free 
movement  
3.1.1 Description 
On entry and on exit of the Schengen area, persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law 
are subject to systematic checks. Indeed, on 7 March 2017, the EU Council adopted a regulation amending 
the SBC to reinforce checks against relevant databases at the external borders.72 This amendment of the SBC 
was presented by the European Commission in December 2015. It is a response to the increase in terrorist 
threats and to the call from the Council in its conclusions of 9 and 20 November 2015 for a targeted revision 
of the SBC in the context of the response to "foreign terrorist fighters". While Member States were already 
obliged to check TCNs systematically on entry against all databases for reasons of public order and internal 
security, the SBC did not provide for such a check on exit in all databases. Moreover, persons enjoying the 
right to free movement were only subject to a minimum check to establish their identities. Regulation (EU) 
2017/458 aligns the obligations to carry out systematic checks both at entry and at exit on third country 
nationals, as well as on persons who enjoy the right of free movement. The databases against which checks 
must be carried out include the Schengen Information System (SIS II) and Interpol's database on stolen and 
lost travel documents (SLTD). The checks will also enable Member States to verify that those persons do not 
represent a threat to public policy, internal security or public health. This obligation applies at all external 
borders (air, sea and land borders), both at entry and exit.73 An interesting novelty provided by Regulation 
(EU) 2017/458 is the fact that the new article 2e of the SBC specifies that checks against SIS and SLTD may be 
carried out in advance on the basis of API data received in accordance with Council Directive 2004/82/EC.74 
                                                          
(2009)7376 final), on 16 August 2010 (C(2010) 5559 final) , on 20 June 2011 (C(2011)3918 final), on 14 December 2012 
(C(2012)9330 final) and on 15 June 2015 (C(2015)3894 final) is available at 
https://www.udiregelverk.no/PageFiles/2778/Practical%20Handbook%20for%20Boarder%20Guards_26.06.2015.pdf  
72 Regulation (EU) 2017/458 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 amending Regulation (EU) 
2016/399 as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders. 
73 However, where systematic consultation of databases could lead to a disproportionate impact on traffic flows at a 
sea or land border, Member States are permitted to carry out only targeted checks against databases, following an 
assessment of the risks related to the public policy, internal security, public health or international relations of any of 
the Member States. The scope and duration of the temporary reduction to targeted checks against the databases shall 
not exceed what is strictly necessary and shall be defined in accordance with a risk assessment carried out by the 
Member State concerned. The Member State concerned shall transmit its risk assessment and updates thereto to the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency (“the Agency”), established by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, without delay and shall report every six months to the Commission and to the Agency on 
the application of the checks against the databases carried out on a targeted basis. The Member State concerned may 
decide to classify the risk assessment or parts thereof. The risk assessment shall state the reasons for the temporary 
reduction to targeted checks against the databases, take into account, inter alia, the disproportionate impact on the 
flow of traffic and provide statistics on passengers and incidents related to cross-border crime. It shall be updated 
regularly.  Persons who, in principle, are not subject to targeted checks against the databases, shall, as a minimum, be 
subject to a check with a view to establishing their identity on the basis of the production or presentation of travel 
documents. Such a check shall consist of a rapid and straightforward verification of the validity of the travel document 
for crossing the border, and of the presence of signs of falsification or counterfeiting, where appropriate by using 
technical devices. With regard to air borders, Member States may only carry out targeted checks against databases for 
a transitional period of 6 months from 7 April 2017. This period may be extended by up to 18 months in exceptional and 
specific cases, where there are infrastructural difficulties requiring a longer period of time to make the necessary 
changes. 
74 Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data. 
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Where those checks are carried out in advance on the basis of such data, the data received in advance shall 
be checked at the border crossing point against the data in the travel document. 
According to article 8(2) of the SBC as amended by Regulation (EU) 2017/458 and by Regulation (EU) 
2017/222575, this systematic check on entry and exit consists of: 
1. Verification of the identity and the nationality of the person and of the authenticity and validity of 
the travel document for crossing the border, including by consulting the relevant databases, in 
particular: the SIS; Interpol’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database; national databases 
containing information on stolen, misappropriated, lost and invalidated travel documents. If the 
travel document contains an electronic storage medium (chip), the authenticity and integrity of the 
chip data shall be confirmed using the complete valid certificate chain, unless this is technically 
impossible or, in the case of a travel document issued by a third country, impossible due to the 
unavailability of valid certificates; 
2. Verification that a person enjoying the right of free movement under Union law is not considered to 
be a threat to the public policy, internal security, public health or international relations of any of the 
Member States, including by consulting the SIS and other relevant Union databases. This is without 
prejudice to the consultation of national and Interpol databases. Where there are doubts as to the 
authenticity of the travel document or the identity of its holder, at least one of the biometric 
identifiers integrated into the passports and travel documents issued in accordance with Regulation 
(EC) No 2252/2004 shall be verified. Where possible, such verification shall also be carried out in 
relation to travel documents not covered by that Regulation. For persons whose entry is subject to a 
registration in the EES, a verification of their identity in the EES shall be carried out according to the 
procedure described in Section 4.4.  
3. Where the checks against the databases referred to in points (1) and (2) would have a 
disproportionate impact on the flow of traffic, a Member State may decide to carry out those checks 
on a targeted basis at specified border crossing points, following an assessment of the risks related 
to the public policy, internal security, public health or international relations of any of the Member 
States. The scope and duration of the temporary reduction to targeted checks against the databases 
shall not exceed what is strictly necessary and shall be defined in accordance with a risk assessment 
carried out by the Member State concerned.76 The risk assessment shall state the reasons for the 
temporary reduction to targeted checks against the databases, take into account, inter alia, the 
disproportionate impact on the flow of traffic and provide statistics on passengers and incidents 
related to cross-border crime. It shall be updated regularly.77 
4. Persons who, in principle, are not subject to targeted checks against the databases, shall, as a 
minimum, be subject to a check with a view to establishing their identity on the basis of the 
production or presentation of travel documents. Such a check shall consist of a rapid and 
straightforward verification of the validity of the travel document for crossing the border, and of the 
presence of signs of falsification or counterfeiting, where appropriate by using technical devices, and, 
in cases where there are doubts about the travel document or where there are indications that such 
                                                          
75 Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System.  
76 The Member State concerned shall transmit its risk assessment and updates thereto to the European Border and 
Coast Guard Agency (“the Agency”), established by Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, without delay and shall report every six months to the Commission and to the Agency on the application of the 
checks against the databases carried out on a targeted basis. The Member State concerned may decide to classify the 
risk assessment or parts thereof. 
77 Where a Member State intends to carry out targeted checks against the databases, it shall notify the other Member 
States, the Agency and the Commission accordingly without delay. The Member State concerned may decide to classify 
the notification or parts thereof. Where the Member States, the Agency or the Commission have concerns about the 
intention to carry out targeted checks against the databases, they shall notify the Member State in question of those 
concerns without delay. The Member State in question shall take those concerns into account. 
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a person could represent a threat to the public policy, internal security, public health or international 
relations of the Member States, the border guard shall consult the databases referred to in points 
(1) and (2).  
The major requirements of this systematic check are presented in the figure below78.  
 
Figure 5 – Checks on persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law 
 
3.1.2 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, the following constraints derived from current EU rules in the 
Schengen Border Code should be taken into account in relation with the checks on persons enjoying the right 
of free movement under Union law: 
1) Recital 3 of Regulation (EU) 2017/458 explicitly states that “the travel documents of persons enjoying 
the right of free movement under Union law should therefore be checked systematically, on entry into 
and on exit from the territory of Member States, against relevant databases for stolen, 
misappropriated, lost and invalidated travel documents in order to ensure that such persons do not 
hide their real identity”. Concretely, this means that the travel document must be presented for 
verification at each entry/exit of the Schengen area. As a reminder, a smartphone cannot be 
considered as a travel document under current EU rules.  
2) In the same way, Article 8(2b) of the SBC states that “persons who, in principle, are not subject to 
targeted checks against SIS and SLTD, shall, as a minimum, be subject to a check with a view to 
establishing their identity on the basis of the production or presentation of travel documents”. As a 
reminder, a smartphone cannot be considered as a travel document under current EU rules.  
 
3) An interesting novelty provided by Regulation (EU) 2017/458 is the fact that the new article 2e of the 
SBC specifies that checks against SIS and SLTD may be carried out in advance on the basis of API data 
received in accordance with Council Directive 2004/82/EC.  Where those checks are carried out in 
advance on the basis of such data, the data received in advance shall be checked at the border 
crossing point against the data in the travel document. As a reminder, a smartphone cannot be 
considered as a travel document under current EU rules.  
The main conclusion derived from these constraints are twofold: 
                                                          
78 This figure was published by Diana Dimitrova and Els Kindt in “Recommendations for future ABC installations – Best 
practices”, edited by Sirra Toivonen & Heta Kojo, VTT technology 303, p. 32, available at 
http://www.vtt.fi/inf/pdf/technology/2017/T303.pdf 
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 It is very doubtful that the mobile scenarios described in D3.1 which seek to replace travel document 
verification by a smartphone application verification could be considered as legal under current EU 
border control regulation; 
 It is also very doubtful that the passport scenario at land border crossing points described in D3.1 
which envisages to transmit passport data via a mobile application could be considered as legal under 
current EU border control regulation since that that travel documents must be presented at each 
entry/exit of the Schengen area.  
 
3.2 Thorough checks on third country nationals (TCNs) 
3.2.1 Description 
As a general rule, TCNs have the right to enter the Schengen area for a short stay of up to 90 days within any 
180-day period either with or without the need for the prior granting of a visa.79 Visas for visits exceeding 
that period remain subject to national procedures.80 It is important to note that regulation (EU) 2017/2226 
of 30 November 201781 has introduced an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal 
of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the external borders of the Schengen Area.  The regulation 
applies to TCNs, both visa required and visa exempt, travelling for short stays of 90 days within a 180 days 
period in the Schengen area.  The EES will replace the current system of manual stamping of passports and 
will electronically register identity data, the date and place of entry and exit as well as entry refusals of TCNs. 
The purpose of the EES is to improve the quality of border checks through the automatic calculation of those 
who overstay the permitted duration (the EES is examined in Section 4.4).  
 
The current Article 8, (3)82of the SBC sets out the list of entry-exit steps governing border control for TCNs. 
Thorough checks on entry shall comprise verification of the conditions governing entry laid down in Article 
6(1) (including the verification that they are in possession of a valid travel document entitling the holder to 
cross the border) and, where applicable, of documents authorizing residence and the pursuit of a professional 
activity. This shall include a detailed examination covering the following aspects: 
 
1. Verification of the identity and the nationality of the third-country national and of the 
authenticity and validity of the travel document for crossing the border, including by consulting 
the relevant databases, in particular: the SIS, Interpol’s SLTD database, national databases 
containing information on stolen, misappropriated, lost and invalidated travel documents. For 
passports and travel documents containing an electronic storage medium (chip), the authenticity 
and integrity of the chip data shall be checked, subject to the availability of valid certificates. 
With the exception of third-country nationals for whom an individual file is already registered in 
the EES, where the travel document contains a facial image recorded in the electronic storage 
medium (chip) and that facial image can be technically accessed, this verification shall include 
the verification of that facial image, by comparing electronically that facial image with the live 
facial image of the third-country national concerned. If technically and legally possible, this 
                                                          
79 Article 6.1 pf the SBC.  
80  The procedures and conditions for issuing national long-stay visas (for intended stays of more than 3 months) are 
covered by national legislation, although holders of a national long-stay visa have the right to circulate within the 
territory of the Member States in accordance with the SBC. 
81 Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an 
Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the 
external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement 
purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and 
(EU) No 1077/2011 
82 Article 8(3), g) of the SBC.  
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verification may be done by verifying the live fingerprints against the fingerprints recorded in the 
electronic storage medium (chip).  
2. Verification that the travel document is accompanied, where applicable, by the requisite visa or 
residence permit. 
3. For persons whose entry or whose refusal of entry is subject to a registration in the EES, a 
verification of their identity by accessing the EES for TCNVEs or by accessing the VIS via the EES 
for TCNVHs (potentially using facial image or fingerprints). For persons whose entry or whose 
refusal of entry is subject to a registration in the EES, verification that the third-country national 
has not reached or exceeded the maximum duration of authorized stay on the territory of the 
Member States and, for third-country nationals holding a visa issued for one or two entries, 
verification that they have respected the number of the maximum authorized entries, by 
consulting the EES; 
4. Verification regarding the point of departure and the destination of the third-country national 
concerned and the purpose of the intended stay, checking, if necessary, the corresponding 
supporting documents; 
5. Verification that the third-country national concerned has sufficient means of subsistence for the 
duration and purpose of the intended stay, for his or her return to the country of origin or transit 
to a third country into which he or she is certain to be admitted, or that he or she is in a position 
to acquire such means lawfully; 
6. Verification that the third-country national concerned, his or her means of transport and the 
objects he or she is transporting are not likely to jeopardize the public policy, internal security, 
public health or international relations of any of the Member States. Such verification shall 
include direct consultation of the data and alerts on persons and, where necessary, objects 
included in the SIS and other relevant Union databases, and the action to be performed, if any, 
as a result of an alert. This is without prejudice to the consultation of national and Interpol 
databases.  
Figure 6 illustrates the current TCNs border checks process on entry and exit 83 
 
                                                          
83 This figure was published by the Research and Development Unit (RDU) of Frontex in n close cooperation with experts 
from a number of European Union Member States in “Guidelines for Processing of Third-Country Nationals through 
Automated Border Control”, 2016, p.18 available at 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Research/Guidelines_for_Processing_of_Third_Country_Nationals_thro
ugh_ABC.pdf 
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Figure 6 - TCNs border checks process on entry and exit 
 
3.2.2 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, the following constraints derived from current EU rules in the 
Schengen Border Code should be taken into account in relation with the checks on TCNs: 
1) For passports and travel documents containing an electronic storage medium (chip), the authenticity and 
integrity of the chip data shall be checked, subject to the availability of valid certificates. With the 
exception of third-country nationals for whom an individual file is already registered in the EES, where 
the travel document contains a facial image recorded in the electronic storage medium (chip) and that 
facial image can be technically accessed, this verification shall include the verification of that facial image, 
by comparing electronically that facial image with the live facial image of the third-country national 
concerned. If technically and legally possible, this verification may be done by verifying the live 
fingerprints against the fingerprints recorded in the electronic storage medium (chip).  Concretely, this 
means that it seems the travel document must be presented for verification at each entry/exit of the 
Schengen area. As a reminder, a smartphone cannot be considered as a travel document under current 
EU rules.  
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2) Thorough checks on entry of TCNs shall comprise verification of the conditions laid down in Article 6(1) 
of the SBC, including the verification that they are in possession of a valid travel document entitling the 
holder to cross the border and, where applicable, of documents authorizing residence and the pursuit of 
a professional activity. Concretely, this means that that the travel document must be presented for 
verification at each entry/exit of the Schengen area. As a reminder, a smartphone cannot be considered 
as a travel document under current EU rules.  
3) An interesting novelty provided by Regulation (EU) 2017/458 is the fact that t checks against SIS and SLTD 
may be carried out in advance on the basis of API data received in accordance with Council Directive 
2004/82/EC.  Where those checks are carried out in advance on the basis of such data, the data received 
in advance shall be checked at the border crossing point against the data in the travel document. As a 
reminder, a smartphone cannot be considered as a travel document under current EU rules.  
The main conclusion derived from these constraints are twofold: 
 It is very doubtful that the mobile scenarios described in D3.1 which seek to replace travel document 
verification by a smartphone application verification could be considered as legal under current EU 
border control regulation; 
 It is also very doubtful that the passport scenario at land border crossing points described in D3.1 
which envisages to transmit passport data via a mobile application could be considered as legal under 
current EU border control regulation since that travel documents must be presented at each 
entry/exit of the Schengen area.  
 
3.3 Overview of the border control checks entry/exit  
In order to summarize the “background checks” which should be taken into account by the PROTECT 
scenarios, the following table illustrates the current border checks processes of all persons crossing the 













All  Verification of valid travel documents or other 
document authorising a traveller to cross the 
border and where applicable the requisite visa 
or residence permit. The documents are also 







All  Checks made to secure that the bearer of the 
travel document is the lawful owner of the 
document 
 




Schengen visas are issued at consular posts 
around the world. The VIS is checked, using 
fingerprints (or facial image in the future) and 
the visa number 
 







EES is checked on the basis of facial image (or 
fingerprints) and the stay is calculated 
automatically. 
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Questions are asked as regards: the purpose of 
the stay; sufficient means of subsistence for the 
duration of the stay and the return to the 
country of origin; other supporting documents 
(e.g. tickets, hotel reservations or invitations to 
meetings). 
 
SIS II and SLTD 




All  SIS II, SLTD and other relevant systems are 
checked to verify that the person is not a threat 
to public policy, internal security, public health, 
or international relations of any of the Member 






All  When the result of all checks can be approved, 








All Depending on the results of all the checks and on 
the questions and observations included at the 
border crossing, there could be alternative 
actions taken related to law enforcement, 
migration and asylum or to verify certain 
requirements (e.g. checking that the document 
is valid or that it is not a forgery).  
 
Internal checks   All  After going through the border checks and 
gaining entry, a person can still be checked in 
the national territory (either as part of a police 
check or an identity check by authorities 
responsible for immigration). 
    
Table 2 - Current border checks of all persons crossing the external borders 
 
3.4 Self-service systems, eGates and automated border control systems 
3.4.1 Introduction  
Regulation (EU) 2017/222584 provides the possibility for Member States to decide whether and to what 
extent to make use of technologies such as self-service systems, eGates and automated border control 
systems for entry and exit checks at the external borders. This regulation also specifies the tasks and roles of 
the border guards when making use of such technologies. In this regard, it should be ensured that the results 
of border checks carried out by automated means are available to border guards so as to enable them to 
take the appropriate decisions. In addition, the Regulation takes into account the need to supervise the use 
of self-service systems, eGates and automated border control systems by travellers so as to prevent 
fraudulent behaviour and usage. 
Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 provides for the following definitions to be included in article 2 of the 
SBC:  
                                                          
84 Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System.  
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• “self-service system” means an automated system which performs all or some of the border checks 
that are applicable to a person and which may be used for pre-enrolling data in the EES; 
• “eGate” means an infrastructure operated by electronic means where an external border or an 
internal border where controls have not yet been lifted is actually crossed; 
• “automated border control system” means a system which allows for an automated border crossing, 
and which is composed of a self-service system and an eGate. 
•  “confirmation of the authenticity and integrity of the chip data” means the process by which it is 
verified, through the use of certificates, that the data on the electronic storage medium (chip) 
originate from the issuing authority and that they have not been changed. 
Automated border control systems shall, to the extent possible, be designed in such a way that they can be 
used by all persons, with the exception of children under 12 years of age. They shall also be designed in a 
way that fully respects human dignity, in particular in cases involving vulnerable persons. Where Member 
States decide to use automated border control systems, they shall ensure the presence of a sufficient number 
of staff to assist persons with the use of such systems.85 
 
3.4.2 Use of automated border control systems for EU/EEA/CH citizens and for third country 
nationals who hold a residence card 
3.4.2.1 Description  
In its proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2016/39986, The EU Commission proposed the 
introduction of a new Article 8a on the “Use of automated border control systems for EU/EEA/CH citizens 
and for third country nationals who hold a residence card”. This proposed article listed the cumulative 
conditions that must be met by EU/EEA/CH citizens and for third country nationals who hold a residence card 
in order to use automated border control systems: “In particular, the person concerned must be in possession 
of an electronic travel document whose chip data shall be authenticated. In addition, the facial image stored 
in the chip shall be accessed in order to verify the identity of the holder by comparing the facial image recorded 
in the chip and the live facial image of the holder of the travel document. For third countries enjoying the right 
of free movement under Union law who hold a residence card, the residence card hold must be an electronic 
card whose chip data shall be authenticated. In addition, the facial image stored in the chip shall be accessed 
so as to verify the identity of the holder of the residence card, by comparing the facial image recorded in the 
chip and his/her live facial image”. 
However, this article was not included in the final version of Regulation (EU) 2017/2225. By consequence, 
neither in the final version of Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 nor in no other EU legal instrument, NO explicit 
references are made to the possible use of self-service systems, eGates and automated border control 
systems by persons enjoying the right to free-movement whom are not subject to registration in the EES.  
3.4.2.2 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, the following constraints derived from current EU on the use of 
automated border checks by persons enjoying the right of free movement under Union law should be taken 
into account: 
1) Neither in the final version of Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 nor in any other EU legal instrument, NO 
explicit references are made to the use of self-service systems, eGates or automated border control 
systems by persons enjoying the right to free-movement whom are not subject to registration in the 
                                                          
85 Article 8c of the SBC.  
86 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as 
regards the use of the Entry/Exit System, Brussels, 6.4.2016, COM(2016) 196 final, 2016/0105 (COD).  
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EES. This being said, no provision explicitly opposes the checks mentioned in article 8(2) of the SBC 
(see Section 3.1) to be operated by eGates and automated border control systems.  
 
2) Even though no provision explicitly opposes the checks mentioned in article 8(2) of the SBC to be 
operated by eGates and automated border control systems, it seems very doubtful that such 
automated border checks could be operated on the basis of “additional biometrics” (other than 
fingerprints or facial image). Indeed, article 8(2) of the SBC explicitly states that “where there are 
doubts as to the authenticity of the travel document or the identity of its holder, at least one of the 
biometric identifiers integrated into the passports and travel documents issued in accordance with 
Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 shall be verified”.  
 
3.4.3 Use of self-service systems and eGates for the border crossing by persons whose border 
crossing is subject to a registration in the EES 
3.4.3.1 Description  
Regulation (EU) 2017/222587 introduces a new article 8b in the SBC. According to this provision, persons 
whose border crossing is subject to a registration in the EES may be permitted to use self-service systems 
and eGates for the carrying out of their border checks, where all of the following conditions are fulfilled: 
 the travel document contains an electronic storage medium (chip) and the authenticity and integrity 
of the chip data are confirmed using the complete valid certificate chain; 
 the travel document contains a facial image recorded in the electronic storage medium (chip) which 
can be technically accessed by the self-service system so as to verify the identity of the holder of the 
travel document, by comparing that facial image with his or her live facial image; and 
 the person is already enrolled or pre-enrolled in the EES. 
For TCNs, where the above conditions are met, all checks described in section 3.2 may be carried out through 
a self-service system on entry and exit except:  
 “Verification regarding the point of departure and the destination of the third-country national 
concerned and the purpose of the intended stay, checking, if necessary, the corresponding 
supporting documents”.  
 “Verification that the third-country national concerned has sufficient means of subsistence for the 
duration and purpose of the intended stay, for his or her return to the country of origin or transit to 
a third country into which he or she is certain to be admitted, or that he or she is in a position to 
acquire such means lawfully”.88  
On entry and exit, the results of the border checks carried out through the self-service system shall be made 
available to a border guard. That border guard shall monitor the results of border checks and, taking into 
account those results, authorise the entry or exit or, otherwise, refer the person to a border guard who shall 
proceed with further checks.  
Finally, where an eGate is used, the corresponding registration of the entry/exit record and the linking of that 
record to the EES89 (the EES system is analysed in Section 4.4) shall be carried out when crossing the border 
                                                          
87 Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System.  
88 Please note that the verification “that the third-country national concerned, his or her means of transport and the 
objects he or she is transporting are not likely to jeopardise the public policy, internal security, public health or 
international relations of any of the Member States” also cannot be thoroughly checked only by consulting databases. 
However, the PROTECT consortium decided to leave customs checks out of the scope of the project.  
89 Pursuant to Article 14 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226.  
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through the eGate. Where the eGate and the self-service system are physically separated, a verification of 
the identity of the user shall take place at the eGate in order to verify that the person using the eGate 
corresponds to the person who used the self-service system. The verification shall be carried out by using at 
least one biometric identifier. It should be underlined that the biometrics features that can be used for that 
linking process seem to be exclusively fingerprint data and facial image.90  
 
3.4.3.2 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, the following constraints derived from current EU rules on self-service 
systems, eGates and automated border control systems by TCNs should be taken into account:  
1) According to article 8b of the SBC one of the conditions for persons whose border crossing is subject 
to a registration in the EES to be permitted to use automated border control systems is that ”the 
travel document contains a facial image recorded in the electronic storage medium (chip) which can 
be technically accessed by the self-service system so as to verify the identity of the holder of the travel 
document, by comparing that facial image with his or her live facial image”. For this reason, it seems 
legally doubtful to use additional biometrics (other than facial image – and in certain cases 
fingerprints) for the aforementioned purpose.  
2) Where the eGate and the self-service system are physically separated, a verification of the identity 
of the user shall take place at the eGate in order to verify that the person using the eGate corresponds 
to the person who used the self-service system. The verification shall be carried out by using at least 
one biometric identifier. However, it seems that the only biometrics features that can be used for 
that linking process (between the self-service system and the eGate) are exclusively fingerprint data 
and facial image (not additional emerging biometrics features). Indeed, article 3(18) of Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2226 defines “biometric data” as “fingerprint data and facial image”.  
3) It should be underlined that not all “background checks” on TCNs can be performed by using a self-
service system without being pre-vetted in a National Facilitation Program (NFP), in particular, the 
following:  
 “Verification regarding the point of departure and the destination of the third-country national 
concerned and the purpose of the intended stay, checking, if necessary, the corresponding 
supporting documents”; 
 “Verification that the third-country national concerned has sufficient means of subsistence for 
the duration and purpose of the intended stay, for his or her return to the country of origin or 
transit to a third country into which he or she is certain to be admitted, or that he or she is in a 
position to acquire such means lawfully”.91  
The legal basis and conditions of NFPs which can potentially be established by national legislation are 
analysed in the next section.  
                                                          
90 Indeed, article 3(18) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 defines “biometric data” as “fingerprint data and facial image”.  
91 Please note that the verification “that the third-country national concerned, his or her means of transport and the 
objects he or she is transporting are not likely to jeopardise the public policy, internal security, public health or 
international relations of any of the Member States” also cannot be thoroughly checked only by consulting databases. 
However, the PROTECT consortium decided to leave customs checks out of the scope of the project.  
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3.4.4 National facilitation programs  
3.4.4.1 Description  
Article 8d of Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 provides that each Member State may establish a voluntary national 
facilitation programme (NFP). For TCNs who are granted access to these NFPs, the thorough checks do not 
have to include the following:  
 “Verification regarding the point of departure and the destination of the third-country national 
concerned and the purpose of the intended stay, checking, if necessary, the corresponding 
supporting documents”; 
 
 “Verification that the third-country national concerned has sufficient means of subsistence for the 
duration and purpose of the intended stay, for his or her return to the country of origin or transit to 
a third country into which he or she is certain to be admitted, or that he or she is in a position to 
acquire such means lawfully”.92  
 
The Member States shall pre-vet TCNs applying to the NFPs in order to verify in particular that the following 
conditions are fulfilled:  
 the applicant fulfils the entry conditions set out in Article 6(1) of the SBC; 
 the applicant’s travel document and, where applicable, visa, long-stay visa or residence permit are 
valid and not false, counterfeit or forged; 
 the applicant proves the need for frequent or regular travel or justifies his or her intention to travel 
frequently or regularly; 
 the applicant proves his or her integrity and reliability, in particular, where applicable, the lawful use 
of previous visas or visas with limited territorial validity, his or her economic situation in the country 
of origin and his or her genuine intention to leave the territory of the Member States before the end 
of the authorised period of stay. Authorities (listed hereunder) shall have access to the EES to verify 
that the applicant has not previously exceeded the maximum duration of authorised stay on the 
territory of the Member States; 
 the applicant justifies the purpose and conditions of the intended stays; 
 the applicant possesses sufficient means of subsistence both for the duration of the intended stays 
and for the return to the country of origin or residence, or that the applicant is in a position to acquire 
such means lawfully; 
 the SIS is consulted. 
Such TCNs must be pre-vetted by border guards, by visa authorities as defined in point 3 of Article 4 of 
Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 or by immigration authorities as defined in point (4) of Article 3(1) of Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2226. When verifying in accordance whether the applicant fulfils the conditions, particular 
consideration shall be given to assessing whether the applicant presents a risk of illegal immigration or a risk 
to the security of any of the Member States and whether the applicant intends to leave the territory of the 
Member States during the authorised stay. The means of subsistence for the intended stays shall be assessed 
according to the duration and the purpose of the envisaged stay or stays and by reference to average prices 
in the Member States concerned for board and lodging in budget accommodation, on the basis of the 
reference amounts set by the Member States. Proof of sponsorship, private accommodation, or both, may 
                                                          
92 Please note that the verification “that the third-country national concerned, his or her means of transport and the 
objects he or she is transporting are not likely to jeopardise the public policy, internal security, public health or 
international relations of any of the Member States” also cannot be thoroughly checked only by consulting  databases. 
However, the PROTECT consortium decided to leave customs checks out of the scope of the project.  
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also constitute evidence of sufficient means of subsistence. The examination of an application shall be based, 
in particular, on the authenticity and reliability of the documents submitted and, on the veracity, and 
reliability of the statements made by the applicant. If a Member State responsible for examining an 
application has any doubts about the applicant, the applicant’s statements or supporting documents that 
have been provided, it may consult other Member States before any decision on the application is taken. 
First access to the NFP shall be granted for a maximum of one year. Access may be extended for a maximum 
of a further five years or until the end of the validity period of the travel document or any issued multiple-
entry visas, long-stay visas and residence permits, whichever is shorter. In the case of an extension, the 
Member State shall reassess every year the situation of each TCN who is granted access to the NFP in order 
to ensure that, based on updated information, that third-country national still meets the abovementioned 
conditions. This reassessment may be performed when border checks are carried out. 
Border guards may carry out the verification of the TCN benefiting from the NFP by comparing the facial 
image taken from the electronic storage medium (chip) and the facial image in the third-country national's 
individual EES file with that third-country national’s face. Full verification shall be carried out at random and 
on the basis of a risk analysis. 
 
3.4.4.2 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In both the mobile and the passport scenarios being described in D3.1, a passenger which would like to use 
the “PROTECT” solution for the first time would need to register via an enrolment kiosk. At this kiosk, they 
would undergo a background check in relevant European and national databases. Once this pre-verification 
is concluded with a positive result, the system would verify the electronic passport and passenger’s biometric 
features with the templates stored on the chip. The entire enrolment process would be supervised by a 
border guard who provides assistance and monitors whether the process goes as planned. The positive 
results of the prior step would then allow passengers for the registration of additional biometric features 
that are applied in the PROTECT solution. 
Given that the scenarios described in D3.1 do not foresee the verification at the kiosk of the two following 
elements: 
• “Verification regarding the point of departure and the destination of the third-country national 
concerned and the purpose of the intended stay, checking, if necessary, the corresponding 
supporting documents”; 
• “Verification that the third-country national concerned has sufficient means of subsistence for the 
duration and purpose of the intended stay, for his or her return to the country of origin or transit to 
a third country into which he or she is certain to be admitted, or that he or she is in a position to 
acquire such means lawfully”; 
In this deliverable, it assumed that the envisaged purpose of D3.1 scenarios is NOT to develop a potential 
technical solution for NFPs. Furthermore, even it was the case, the processing of additional biometrics for 
NFP purposes would a priori seem to be disproportionate as article 8d of the SBC refers to the sole 
comparison of “the facial image taken from the electronic storage medium (chip) and the facial image in the 
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4 Biometrics in EU information systems for border control 
management 
4.1 Introduction  
Having recalled the border checks processes of all persons crossing the external borders which should be 
taken into account by the PROTECT scenarios described in D3.1, this section provides for an overview of the 
EU databases for border control management, the purposes of these databases and the information 
contained therein. Indeed, border control management increasingly relies on information provided to border 
guards through the consultation of a number of centralized databases. For what concerns these information 
systems, each have their own objectives, purposes, legal bases, user groups and institutional context. Given 
that the main objective of the PROTECT project is to develop a contactless multimodal biometric solution for 
identity confirmation of travellers to help border guards to facilitate and fasten the border crossings of 
travellers, the PROTECT consortium decided to focus its analysis on the information systems being used for 
border management and exclude from its scope the information systems used for law enforcement 
purposes.93 The figure below illustrates this distinction.94  
 
 
Figure 7 - Schematic overview of the main information systems for border management 
The four main centralized information systems developed by the EU for border control management are (i) 
the Schengen Information System (SIS) with a broad spectrum of alerts on persons and objects, (ii) the Visa 
Information System (VIS) with data on short-stay visas, (iii) the Entry-Exit System (EES), which expected to be 
implemented by 2020 to replace manual stamping of passports and (iv) the EURODAC system with fingerprint 
                                                          
93 In the same way, for SIS, this deliverable only analyses the system from the border control management purpose, 
excluding the law enforcement purposes and accesses by law enforcement authorities.  
94 This illustration was issued in Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, 
“Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security”, Brussels, 6.4.2016, COM(2016) 205 final, p.6.  
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data of asylum applicants and third-country nationals who have crossed the external borders irregularly. 
These four systems are complementary, and – with the exception of SIS – primarily targeted at third-country 
nationals. Additional existing instruments for border management are Interpol's Stolen and Lost Travel 
Documents (SLTD) database and the Advance Passenger Information (API) that collects information on 
passengers ahead of inbound flights to the EU. Finally, the EU Commission is proposing a EU Travel 
Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS), where visa-exempt travellers would register relevant 
information regarding their intended journey. 
As a preliminary remark, it should be emphasised that the four EU centralized databases using biometrics for 
border control management (SIS, VIS, EES, EURODAC) are (or are in the process) to rely on:  
 Fingerprints 
 Facial image 
The table below illustrates the biometric data stored in in existing and planned IT-systems for border control 
management purposes. Proposed systems and proposed changes in italics.  It is worth mentioning that the 
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Table 3 - Overview of biometrics contained in Schengen databases 
4.2 The Schengen Information System (SIS) 
4.2.1 Purpose of SIS 
SIS is currently the largest and most widely used information exchange platform on immigration.95 It is a 
centralised system used by 25 EU Member States96 and four Schengen associated countries97, currently 
containing 63 million alerts. The second generation of the Schengen Information System (hereinafter “SIS II”) 
entered into operation on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 1987/200698 and contains records on third-country 
nationals prohibited to enter or stay in the Schengen area as well as on EU and third country nationals who 
are wanted or missing (including children) and on wanted objects (firearms, vehicles, identity documents, 
                                                          
95 This deliverable only analyses SIS from the border management perspective excluding the law enforcement purposes 
of the system.  
96 All, except Ireland, Cyprus, Croatia 
97 Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland 
98 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the 
establishment, operation and use of the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II), (OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, 
p. 4). 
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industrial equipment, etc.). For border control management purposes, the SIS enables border guards to 
consult alerts on third-country nationals for the purpose of refusing their entry into or stay in the Schengen 
Area.  
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that on 21 December 2016 the Commission issued a “SIS Proposal on 
return”.99 The aim of this proposal is to:  
 oblige Member States to enter an alert in the SIS in all cases where an entry ban has been issued to 
an illegally staying third country national in accordance with Directive 2008/115/EC15 (hereinafter 
“Return directive”)100; 
 harmonise national procedures by introducing a new obligatory consultation procedure to avoid that 
a third-country national who is subject to an entry ban in one Member State, holds a valid residence 
permit issued by another Member State. 
 
4.2.2 Current use of biometrics in SIS for border control management  
For alerts on persons, articles 20 of Regulation 1987/2006 state that the information on persons in relation 
to whom an alert has been issued shall be no more than the following: 
 surname(s) and forename(s), name(s) at birth and previously used names and any aliases which may 
be entered separately; 
 any specific, objective, physical characteristics not subject to change; 





 whether the person concerned is armed, violent or has escaped; 
 reason for the alert 
 authority issuing the alert; 
 a reference to the decision giving rise to the alert; 
 action to be taken; 
 link(s) to other alerts issued in SIS II; 
In the context of the PROTECT project, it should be emphasized that photographs (not facial image) and 
fingerprints are currently the only biometric modalities which may currently be processed within the SIS II 
database for border control management purposes. Furthermore, fingerprints can only be used to verify and 
confirm the identity of a person who has already been identified on the basis of an alphanumeric search.101  
This being said, it is worth mentioning that the new article 2e of the SBC Regulation as amended by Regulation 
(EU) 2017/458 specifies that checks against SIS may be carried out in advance on the basis of API data 
                                                          
99 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the use of the Schengen Information 
System for the return of illegally staying third country nationals (hereinafter “the SIS Proposal on return”), COM(2016) 
881 final. 
100 Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards 
and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98). 
101 Article 22, b) of Regulation 1987/2006. 
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received in accordance with Council Directive 2004/82/EC.  Where those checks are carried out in advance 
on the basis of such data, the data received in advance shall be checked at the border crossing point against 
the data in the travel document. 
Article 22 (a)of Regulation 1987/2006 contains specific rules for photographs and fingerprints in SIS. This 
article reads as follows: 
“The use of photographs and fingerprints […] shall be subject to the following provisions: 
(a) photographs and fingerprints shall only be entered following a special quality check to ascertain the 
fulfilment of a minimum data quality standard. [specifications of the special quality check shall be established 
in accordance to the procedure referred to in article 67 of Decision 2007/533/JHA and 51 of Regulation 
1987/2006]” 
In this context, on 4 August 2016, the EC adopted implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1345 on minimum data 
quality standards for fingerprint records within SIS II.102 The annex of this Decision sets forth the minimum 
requirements relating to standards and input formats which are to be met when capturing and transmitting 
fingerprint data to SIS II.  
 
4.2.3 Future use of biometrics in SIS for border control management  
4.2.3.1 Automatic Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) 
Article 22(c) of Regulation 1987/2006 foresees that SIS may also be used to identify a person on the basis of 
his/her fingerprints, a functionality which requires the implementation of an Automatic Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS) “once it becomes technically possible” and when the Commission has presented 
“a report on the availability and readiness of the required technology on which the European Parliament is 
consulted”. In 2015, the Joint Research Centre (JRC) published a study, carried out for DG HOME, on the 
readiness and availability of AFIS technologies for their introduction in SIS-II. 103 The study summarises a 
review of the scientific literature, visits to authorities managing AFIS in nine Member States and in the United 
States of America and consultations with eu-LISA and with AFIS vendors. The study concludes that AFIS 
technology has reached a satisfactory level of readiness and availability and proposes a series of 
recommendations in order to accomplish a successful implementation of a SIS-II AFIS. On the basis of this 
study, in 2016, the Commission issued a report on “The availability and readiness of technology to identify a 
person on the basis of fingerprints held in the second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II)”.104 
The conclusion of this report is that the Commission considers that the implementation of 19 
recommendations should be considered to support the successful deployment and use of an AFIS in SIS.  
It is worth mentioning that the Commission envisages the use of AFIS, in case of doubts on the identity of a 
traveller, in its Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment, operation and use of the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks105 (hereinafter “the SIS Proposal on border checks”). 
Indeed, article 28 of the Proposal states that “If the identity of the person cannot be ascertained by other 
                                                          
102 Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2016/1345 of 4 August 2016 on minimum data quality standards for 
fingerprint records within the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (notified under document 
C(2016) 4988).  
103 This study is available at http://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC97779/lbna27473enn.pdf 
104 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, “The availability and readiness of 
technology to identify a person on the basis of fingerprints held in the second generation Schengen Information System 
(SIS II)”, Brussels, 29.2.2016, COM(2016) 93 final.  
105 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment, operation and use of 
the Schengen Information System (SIS) in the field of border checks, amending Regulation (EU) No 515/2014 and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 (hereinafter “the SIS Proposal on border checks”), COM(2016) 882 final. Current 
version is available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CONSIL:ST_14115_2017_INIT&from=EN 
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means, dactyloscopic data shall be searched for identification purposes. Dactyloscopic data may be searched 
in all cases to identify a person”.106 
 
4.2.3.2 Facial image 
In its SIS Proposal on border checks, the Commission also envisages the inclusion of facial image in the SIS in 
order to ensure consistency in border control procedures where the identification and the verification of 
identity are required by the use of facial images.107 Article 28(4) specifies that “As soon as this becomes 
technically possible, and while ensuring a high degree of reliability of identification, photographs and facial 
images may be used to identify a person. Before this functionality is implemented in SIS, the Commission shall 
present a report on the availability and readiness of the required technology, on which the European 
Parliament shall be consulted. Identification based on photographs or facial images shall only be used subject 
to national law”.  
 
4.2.4 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, the following major constraint derived from current EU rules on SIS II 
should be taken into account:  
1) First, it should be recalled that Regulation (EU) 2017/458 imposes the travel documents of both all 
third-country nationals and persons enjoying the right of free movement to be verified against SIS II 
on entry and exit of the Schengen Area. 
2) Secondly, Article 22 of Regulation 1987/2006 specify that the only biometric modalities which may 
currently be processed within the SIS II database are photographs (facial image in the future) and 
fingerprints. Furthermore, currently, fingerprints can only be used to verify and confirm the identity 
of a person who has already been identified on the basis of an alphanumeric search.  
 
4.3 The Visa Information System (VIS)  
4.3.1 Purpose of VIS 
The VIS is a centralised system for the exchange of data on short-stay visas between Member States. It 
processes data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas to visit, or to transit through, the 
Schengen area. All the consulates of the Schengen States (around 2000) and all their external border crossing 
points (in total some 1800) have been connected to the system. The VIS contains data on visa applications 
and decisions, as well as whether issued visas are revoked, annulled, or extended. It currently contains data 
on 20 million visa applications and, at peak-times, it handles over 50.000 transactions per hour.  
Article 2 of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008108 defines the purpose of VIS as to improve the implementation of 
the common visa policy, consular cooperation and consultations between the central visa authorities by: 
                                                          
106 In the same way, recital 18A of the SIS Proposal on border checks states that “It should be possible in all cases to 
identify a person by using dactyloscopic data. Wherever the identity of the person cannot be ascertained by any other 
means, dactyloscopic data should be used to attempt to ascertain the identity”. 
107 Article 20 (w) of the SIS Proposal on border checks.  
108 Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning the Visa 
Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS Regulation) as 
amended by Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a 
Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). A consolidated version is available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:2008R0767:20100405:EN:PDF 
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 facilitating the visa application procedure; 
 preventing visa shopping; 
 facilitating the fight against fraud; 
 facilitating checks at external border crossing points and in the national territories; 
 assisting in the identification of persons that do not meet the requirements for entering, staying or 
residing in the national territories; 
 facilitating the application of the Dublin III Regulation109 for determining the EU country that is 
responsible for the examination of a non-EU country national’s asylum application and for examining 
said application; 
 contributing to the prevention of threats to EU countries’ internal security. 
 
4.3.2 Current use of biometrics in VIS 
Article 5 of Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 specifies that only the following categories of data are recorded in 
the VIS: 
 alphanumeric data on the applicant and on the visas requested, issued, refused, annulled, revoked 
or extended; 
 photographs; 
 fingerprint data; 
 links to previous visa applications and to the application files of persons travelling together. 
As noted in Section 2.4, 10 fingerprints and a digital photograph (not facial image) are collected from persons 
applying for a visa. These biometric data, along with data provided in the visa application form, are recorded 
in the Visa Information System (VIS).110 
At the entry of Schengen Area's external borders, border guards “have access to search [the VIS] with the 
number of the visa sticker in combination with verification of fingerprints of the visa holder, or the number of 
the visa sticker”.111 By consequence, when arriving at the external border of the Schengen area, visa holders 
have to provide their fingerprints for comparison with those registered in the VIS, if requested by Schengen 
States' border control authorities. This process is meant to guarantee that the person that applied for the 
visa is the same person as the one crossing the border.  
Commission Decision of 9 October 2009 lays down specifications for the resolution and use of fingerprints 
for biometric identification and verification in the VIS.  
 
4.3.3 Future use of biometrics in VIS 
In 2016, an overall evaluation of the VIS stated that “to address reported hindrances in collecting biometrics, 
in particular those affecting the quality of facial images, and to allow in the future combined searches using 
                                                          
109 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (Dublin III Regulation), replacing Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (Dublin II 
Regulation), lays down the criteria and mechanisms for determining which EU country is responsible for examining an 
asylum application. 
110 10-digit finger scans are not required from children under the age of 12 or from people who physically cannot provide 
finger scans. Frequent travellers to the Schengen Area do not have to give new finger scans every time they apply for a 
new visa. Once finger scans are stored in VIS, they can be re-used for further visa applications over a 5-year period. 
111 Article 20 of the Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 9 July 2008 concerning 
the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay visas (VIS Regulation). 
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facial image, alternative standards could be put in place, such as taking photographs directly when applying 
for a visa”.112 
The Commission confirmed its intention to use the facial image for biometric matching against the VIS in in 
article 15.5 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 which reads as follows: “Within a period of two years following the 
start of operations of the EES, the Commission shall produce a report on the quality standards of facial images 
stored in the VIS and on whether they are such that they enable biometric matching with a view to using facial 
images stored in the VIS at borders and within the territory of the Member States for the verification of the 
identity of third-country nationals subject to a visa requirement, without storing such facial images in the EES. 
The Commission shall transmit that report to the European Parliament and to the Council. That report shall 
be accompanied, where considered appropriate by the Commission, by legislative proposals, including 
proposals to amend this Regulation, Regulation (EC) No 767/2008, or both, as regards the use of the facial 
images of third-country nationals stored in the VIS for the purposes referred to in this paragraph”.  
 
4.3.4 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, the following major constraint derived from current EU rules on VIS 
should be taken into account:  
Currently, at border crossing points, the VIS is used to verify the identity of visa holders by comparing his/her 
fingerprints with the fingerprints stored in the VIS on request of the border guards. This process guarantees 
that the person that applied for the visa is the same person as the one crossing the border. The fact that 
TCNVHs could be required to provide their fingerprint at the entry of the Schengen Area should be taken into 
account when developing a complete contactless biometric-based cross-border control solution. The use the 
facial image for biometric matching against the VIS has not yet been implemented. This issue could be 
resolved once the EES will become functional and that TCNVHs would be able to pre-enrol their facial image 
into that system.  
 
 
4.4 The Entry-exit system (EES) 
4.4.1 Background 
In February 2013, the Commission adopted a “Smart Borders package” consisting of three proposals: (1) a 
Regulation for an Entry/Exit System (EES)113 for the recording of information on the time and place of entry 
and exit of third country nationals travelling to the Schengen area, (2) a Regulation for a Registered Traveller 
Programme (RTP)114 to allow third country nationals who have been pre-vetted to benefit from facilitation of 
border checks at the Union external border, (3) a Regulation amending the Schengen Borders Code115 in order 
to take into account the existence of the EES and RTP. 
                                                          
112 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of Regulation (EC) 
No 767/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), the use of 
fingerprints at external borders and the use of biometrics in the visa application procedure/REFIT Evaluation, Brussels, 
14.10.2016, COM(2016) 655 final, p.13.  
113 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to 
register entry and exit data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the 
European Union Brussels, 28.2.2013, COM(2013) 95 final.  
114 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Registered Traveller 
Programme, Brussels, 28.2.2013, COM(2013) 97 final. 
115 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 as 
regards the use of the Entry/Exit System (EES) and the Registered Traveller Programme (RTP), COM (2013) 96.  
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This 2013 SBP package was poorly received. The European Parliament and the Council expressed strong 
reservations over its cost, technical feasibility, and scope.116 The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), 
the Article 29 Working Party (WP29), and civil society groups such as the Meijers Committee voiced major 
concerns regarding necessity and proportionality, particularly in light of the volume of personal data 
processing the measures would entail. The European Commission's own Impact Assessment Board twice 
asked DG Home to provide evidence supporting the need for EU action in relation to the objectives set by 
the Smart Borders package.117  
In the context of the preparation of a revised proposal and in order to assess the technical, organisational 
and financial impact of possible solutions to the contentious issues, the Commission initiated with the 
support of both co-legislators a so-called “proof of concept” exercise consisting of two stages: 
 A Commission-led Technical Study on Smart Borders118, and 
 A testing phase led by eu-LISA (European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT 
systems in the area of freedom, security and justice) on the impact of the use of various biometric 
identifiers on the border control processes.119 
The Commission also conducted a public consultation on the Smart Borders Package, inviting citizens (both 
EU nationals and non-EU nationals) and organisations to contribute. The results of the consultation were 
published in December 2015.120 
After having carried out this long process, on April 2016, the EC adopted a revised legislative proposal for 
Smart Borders in which she decided to: 
• revise its 2013 proposal for a Regulation for the establishment of an Entry/Exit System (hereafter 
“EES proposal”)121; 
• revise its 2013 proposal for Regulation amending the Schengen Borders Code to integrate the 
technical changes that result from the new proposal for a Regulation establishing an Entry/Exit 
System (hereafter “SBC-EES proposal”)122. 
                                                          
116 European Parliament IMPA (2013), Initial appraisal of a European Commission impact assessment: Smart Borders 
Package, PE 514.062.  
117 European Commission Impact Assessment Board (2013), Opinion – DG Home – Impact assessment on a proposal 
establishing the entry/exit system, Brussels, 2010/HOME/004; European Commission Impact Assessment Board (2013), 
Opinion – DG Home – Impact assessment on a proposal establishing the entry/exit system, Brussels, 2010/HOME/006.  
118 Technical Study on Smart Borders, European Commission, DG HOME, 2014. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-wedo/policies/borders-and-visas/smart-borders/index_en.htm 
119 The aim of the Pilot was to verify the feasibility of the options proposed in the Technical Study in operational 
environments with real travellers across the EU. Twelve different test cases were performed in 18 Border Crossing Points 
spread over eleven Member States, covering air, sea and land borders in different climatological situations, with 
different operational requirements. In total 78 tests were carried out. The pilot not only collected quantitative test case 
results but also sought feedback from travellers as well as border guards. See Final Report of the Smart Borders Pilot 
Project, eu-LISA, December 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-wedo/policies/borders-and-visas/smart-
borders/index_en.htm  
120 Results of the consultations are available at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2015/consulting_0030 
121 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to 
register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the 
Member States of the European Union and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement 
purposes and amending Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 and Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011, Brussels, 6.4.2016, 
COM(2016) 194 final. 
122 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as 
regards the use of the Entry/Exit System, Brussels, 6.4.2016, COM (2016) 196 final 
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• withdraw its 2013 proposal for a Regulation for a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP). 
Nonetheless, the SBC-EES proposal introduces a legal provision for national facilitation programmes 
that can be established by Member States on a voluntary basis (Article 8e). 
On 25 October 2017, the European Parliament plenary session voted to adopt the Entry/Exit System. 
Members also approved the amendments needed to integrate the new Entry/Exit System into the Schengen 
Borders Code. The Council adopted both Regulation (EU) 2017/2225123 and Regulation (EU) 2017/2226124 in 
November 2017. The Entry/Exit System is due to become fully functional by 2020 at the latest. 
 
4.4.2 Purpose of the EES 
As already mentioned, the general rule is that TCNs have the right to enter the Schengen area for a short stay 
of up to 90 days within any 180-day period either with or without the need for the prior granting of a visa.  
Third country nationals who are in possession of a valid residence permit or long stay visa issued by a Member 
State ('residence permit holders') are not bound by this limitation. Currently the stamping of the travel 
documents indicating the dates of entry and exit is the sole method available to border guards and 
immigration authorities to calculate the duration of stay of “short stay TCNs” and to verify if someone is 
overstaying. These stamps can be difficult to interpret: they may be unreadable or the result of 
counterfeiting. 
For that reason, the aims of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 establishing the EES is to ensure: 
« (a) the recording and storage of the date, time and place of entry and exit of third–country nationals 
crossing the borders of the Member States at which the EES is operated; 
(b) the calculation of the duration of the authorized stay of such third-country nationals; 
(c) the generation of alerts to Member States when the authorized stay has expired; and 
(d) the recording and storage of the date, time and place of refusal of entry of third-country nationals whose 
entry for a short stay has been refused, as well as the authority of the Member State which refused the 
entry and the reasons therefor”.125 
The Regulation establishing the EES addresses TCNs entering the Schengen area for a short stay with or 
without visa (both TCNVHs and TCNVEs). Third-country nationals who enjoy the right of free movement or 
the rights of free movement equivalent to those of EU citizens (family members of EU citizens or permanent 
residents) but who do not yet have a residence card are also included. On the other hand, the proposed EES 
Regulation excludes from its scope persons enjoying the right of free movement, TCNs holding a residence 
permit, TCNs holding a long-stay visa as well as other TCNs under Article 2(3) of the proposed EES Regulation. 
An automated calculator is included in the EES to inform border guards:  
« (a) on entry, of the maximum duration of authorized stay of third-country nationals and whether the 
number of authorized entries of a short-stay visa issued for one or two entries has been exhausted; 
                                                          
123 Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 amending 
Regulation (EU) 2016/399 as regards the use of the Entry/Exit System.  
124 Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 November 2017 establishing an 
Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and exit data and refusal of entry data of third-country nationals crossing the 
external borders of the Member States and determining the conditions for access to the EES for law enforcement 
purposes, and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulations (EC) No 767/2008 and 
(EU) No 1077/2011.  
125 Article 1 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226.  
PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 Deliverable D2.2 
Page 56 of 71  
 
(b) during checks or verifications carried out within the territory of the Member States, of the remaining 
authorized stay or duration of overstay of the third-country nationals; 
(c) on exit, of any overstay of third-country nationals; 
(d) when examining and deciding on short-stay visa applications, of the maximum remaining duration of 
authorized stay based on intended entry dates”.126 
 
4.4.3 Storage of biometrics in the EES 
The data registered in the revised EES includes 26 elements, down from 36 in the 2013 proposal:  
 Identity of third-country national: first name, surname, date of birth, nationality, gender; 
 Biometrics: four fingerprints and a facial image for TCNVEs. The EES does not store the biometric 
data of TCNVHs, which remain stored in VIS;  
 Information on travel document: document number, document type, document country code and 
expiry date;  
 Information on the TCHVHs: visa sticker number, visa expiry date, number of authorised entries, 
authorised period of stay;  
 Information on cross-border movements of the person: date and time of entry, authority allowing 
entry, entry border crossing point, date and time of exit, exit border crossing point;  
 Information on changes of authorisation of stay: revised expiry date of the authorisation of stay, date 
of change of limit of stay, place of change of limit of stay, ground for change or revocation.  
The EES system would process biometric data of both TCNVHs and TCNVEs in two ways:  
• Firstly, by recording/enrolling biometric identifiers from TCNVEs (four fingerprints in combination 
with a facial image). The four fingerprints are used at enrolment to check if the third country national 
was already registered in the system while the facial image allows for a quick and reliable (automatic) 
verification at subsequent entry that the individual subject to the border control is the one already 
registered in the EES; 
• Secondly, by pulling biometric identifiers for TCNVHs from VIS. 
This statement is written down in Recital 21 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 which reads as follows: “Four 
fingerprints per visa-exempt third–country national should be registered in the EES, if physically possible, to 
allow for accurate verification and identification, thus ensuring that the third–country national is not already 
registered under another identity or with another travel document, and to guarantee that sufficient data are 
available in order to ensure that the objectives of the EES are achieved in every circumstance. The fingerprints 
of visa-holding third-country nationals should be checked against the VIS. The facial image of both visa-
exempt and visa holding third-country nationals should be registered in the EES. Fingerprints or facial images 
should be used as a biometric identifier for verifying the identity of third–country nationals who have been 
previously registered in the EES, for as long as their individual files have not been deleted”.  
 
                                                          
126 Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226. 
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4.4.4 Use of self-service systems for pre-enrolling data in the EES 
Regulation (EU) 2017/2225 introduces a new article 8a in the SBC. According to this provision, persons whose 
border crossing is subject to a registration in the EES may use self-service systems for the purpose of pre-
enrolling in the EES if the following conditions are fulfilled:  
• the travel document contains an electronic storage medium (chip) and the authenticity and integrity 
of the chip data are confirmed using the complete valid certificate chain; 
• the travel document contains a facial image recorded in the electronic storage medium (chip) which 
can be technically accessed by the self-service system so as to verify the identity of the holder of the 
travel document by comparing the facial image recorded in the electronic storage medium (chip) 
with his or her live facial image; if technically and legally possible, this verification may be done by 
verifying the live fingerprints against the fingerprints recorded in the electronic storage medium 
(chip) of the travel document. 
If the two above conditions are fulfilled, persons whose border crossing is subject to a registration in the EES 
may use self-service systems to pre-enrol in the EES the following data:  
• surname (family name), first name or names (given names), date of birth, nationality or nationalities, 
sex; 
• the type and number of the travel document or documents and the three-letter code of the issuing 
country of the travel document or documents; 
• the date of expiry of the validity of the travel document or documents; 
• the facial image; 
• where applicable, the status of that third-country national indicating that he or she is a third-country 
national who: a) is a member of the family of a Union citizen to whom Directive 2004/38/EC applies 
or of a national of a third country enjoying the right of free movement equivalent to that of Union 
citizens under an agreement between the Union and its Member States, on the one hand, and a third 
country, on the other; and b) does not hold a residence card pursuant to Directive 2004/38/EC or a 
residence permit pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002; 
• the short-stay visa sticker number, including the three-letter code of the issuing Member State, the 
type of short-stay visa, the end date of the maximum duration of the stay as authorized by the short-
stay visa, which shall be updated at each entry, and the date of expiry of the validity of the short-stay 
visa, where applicable; 
• on the first entry on the basis of a short-stay visa, the number of entries and the duration of stay 
authorized by the short-stay visa as indicated on the short-stay visa sticker; 
• where applicable, the information indicating that the short-stay visa has been issued with limited 
territorial validity.  
After the above-mentioned data are pre-enrolled, the self-service system shall verify whether the person has 
a previous registration in the EES and shall verify the identity of the third-country national in accordance with 
the following procedure: 
1) In the event that data concerning the person are not recorded in the EES, third-country nationals who 
are subject to a visa requirement to cross the external borders shall pre-enrol in the EES through the self-
service system the abovementioned data. Subsequently, the person shall be referred to a border guard 
who shall: 
 pre-enrol the data concerned, where it was not possible to collect all the required data through 
the self-service system; 
 verify that the travel document used at the self-service system corresponds to the one held by 
the person in front of the border guard, that the live facial image of the person concerned 
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corresponds to the facial image that was collected though the self-service system, and for 
persons who do not hold a visa required, that the live fingerprints of the person concerned 
correspond to the fingerprints that were collected though the self-service system; 
 when the decision to authorise or refuse entry has been taken, confirm the data.  
2) Where the pre-enrolment operations indicate that data on the person are recorded in the EES, the self-
service system shall assess whether any of the data need to be updated. Where this assessment reveals 
that the person referred has an individual file registered in the EES but that his or her data need to be 
updated, the person shall: 
 update the data in the EES by pre-enrolling them through the self-service system; 
 be referred to a border guard who shall verify the correctness of the update under point (a) of this 
paragraph and, when the decision to authorise or refuse entry has been taken, update the individual 
file.  
Self-service systems shall be operated under the supervision of a border guard who shall be in charge of 
detecting any inappropriate, fraudulent or abnormal use of the self-service system. 
 
4.4.5 Use of biometrics in the EES by border guards 
Article 23 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2226 contains the rules of access of border guards to the EES. Border 
authorities have access to the EES for verifying the identity and previous registration of the third-country 
national, for updating the EES data where necessary and for consulting the data to the extent required for 
the carrying out of border checks. While performing these tasks, the border authorities have access to search 
with the following data: 
(a) surname (family name); first name or names (given names); date of birth; nationality or nationalities; 
sex; 
(b) the type and number of the travel document or documents and the three-letter code of the issuing 
country of the travel document or documents; 
(c) the date of expiry of the validity of the travel document or documents.  
In addition, for the purposes of consulting the VIS for verification of third-country nationals who are subject 
to a visa requirement, the border authorities shall launch a search in the VIS directly from the EES using the 
same alphanumeric data.  
If the search in the EES with the above-mentioned data indicates that data on the third-country national are 
recorded in the EES, the border authorities shall compare the live facial image of the third-country national 
with the facial image in the EES or the border authorities shall, in the case of visa-exempt third-country 
nationals, proceed to a verification of fingerprints against the EES and, in the case of third-country nationals 
subject to a visa requirement, proceed to a verification of fingerprints directly against the VIS. For the 
verification of fingerprints against the VIS for visa holders, the border authorities may launch the search in 
the VIS directly from the EES. If the verification of the facial image fails, the verification shall be carried out 
using fingerprints and vice versa. It has to be emphasized that the main biometric identifier (facial image or 
fingerprint) to be used for verification at border crossing points depends on a choice of national authorities. 
Indeed, recital 21 states that: “In order to take into account the specificities of each border crossing point and 
the different kinds of borders, the national authorities should establish for each border crossing point whether 
the fingerprints or the facial image are to be used as the main biometric identifier for carrying out the required 
verification”.  
4.4.6 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios  
In the context of the PROTECT project, the following major constraint derived from current EU rules on EES 
should be taken into account: 
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1) According to Regulation (EU) 2017/2226, in order to take into account the specificities of each border 
crossing point and the different kinds of borders, the national authorities should establish for each 
border crossing point whether the fingerprints or the facial image are to be used as the main 
biometric identifier for carrying out the required verification. To be pragmatic, this means that a 
complete contactless solution could not yet be implemented at borders where the main chosen 
biometric feature for verification against the EES is fingerprints.  
2) It should be emphasized that for TCNVHs, the border guards must launch a search from the EES to 
the VIS for biometric verification. As a reminder, currently, the VIS is used to verify the identity of 
visa holders by comparing his/her fingerprints with the fingerprints stored in the VIS on request of 
the border guards. The fact that TCNVHs could be required to provide their fingerprint at the entry 
of the Schengen Area should be taken into account when developing a complete contactless 
biometric-based cross-border control solution. The use the facial image for biometric matching 
against the VIS has not yet been implemented. This issue could be resolved once the EES will become 
functional and that TCNVHs would be able to pre-enrol their facial image into that system. 
3) Furthermore, both in the passport and the mobile scenarios (both types A and B), D3.1 envisages the 
enrolment of additional biometrics (other than fingerprints or facial image) at “a kiosk”. It is not clear 
whether a self-service system (referred to as “kiosk” in D3.1) as defined by article 1 of Regulation 
(EU) 2017/2225 could be used to enrol additional biometrics other than facial image as this is the 
only biometric feature explicitly listed by for possible enrolment in Article 8a of said Regulation.  
 
4.5 EURODAC 
EURODAC is an EU-wide biometric database containing fingerprints of asylum applicants and non-EU/EEA 
nationals for comparison between EU countries. The EURODAC fingerprint database has been established by 
Council Regulation (EC) 2725/2000.127 The first aim of EURODAC is to help to apply the Dublin III Regulation128, 
which lays down rules for determining which EU country is responsible for examining an asylum 
application.129 Each EU country must take the fingerprints of all fingers of asylum applicants and those 
apprehended while trying to cross a border irregularly (e.g. non-EU/EEA nationals or stateless persons 
entering without valid documents) over the age of 14 and, within 72 hours, transmit the data to EURODAC. 
When an asylum-seeker or non-EU/EEA national has been found to be present illegally in an EU country, then 
that EU country can consult EURODAC to determine whether the individual has previously applied for asylum 
in an EU country or has previously been apprehended when trying to unlawfully enter the EU. Fingerprint 
data should be erased once asylum applicants, non-EU/EEA nationals or stateless persons obtain citizenship 
of an EU country.  
Due to the large scale arrivals since the start of the migration and refugee crisis in 2015, some Member States 
became overwhelmed with fingerprinting all those arriving irregularly to the EU at the external borders, and 
who further transited through the EU en route to their preferred destination. As a consequence, thousands 
of migrants have remained invisible in Europe, a situation that facilitates unauthorised secondary and 
subsequent movements and irregular stay within the EU. As part of the first reform package of May 2016, 
                                                          
127 Council Regulation (EC) 2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establishment of “Eurodac” for the 
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention.  
128 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 (Dublin III Regulation), replacing Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (Dublin II 
Regulation), lays down the criteria and mechanisms for determining which EU country is responsible for examining an 
asylum application. 
129 The second aim of EURODAC is to allow national police forces and Europol to compare fingerprints linked to criminal 
investigations with those contained in EURODAC. However, due to the fundamental right to privacy, law enforcement 
agencies are only allowed to use EURODAC for comparisons: (1) if there are reasonable grounds that doing so will 
substantially assist them in preventing, detecting or investigating a terrorist offence or other serious criminal offence; 
and (2) only as a last resort after several other checks have been carried out first. 
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the Commission presented a proposal to reinforce EURODAC130 to make sure that it continues to provide the 
fingerprint comparison evidence it needs to function. The extension of the scope of EURODAC as proposed 
in the recast 2016 extends its scope for the purposes of identifying illegally staying third country nationals 
and those who have entered the European Union irregularly at the external borders, with a view to use this 
information to assist Member States to re-document a third country national for return purposes. This new 
purpose of EURODAC has been described in Article 1 (b) of the Recast proposal as follows: “assist with the 
control of illegal immigration to and secondary movements within the Union and with the identification of 
illegally staying third-country nationals for determining the appropriate measures to be taken by Member 
States, including removal and repatriation of persons residing without authorisation”. 
EURODAC is available at border crossing points, but unlike SIS, VIS and EES, it is not a border management 
system. For this reason, the EURODAC system will not be extensively analysed in this deliverable.  
 
4.6  INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) 
4.6.1 Purpose 
INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) database is a central database on passports and other 
travel documents that have been reported stolen or lost by the issuing authorities to INTERPOL. SLTD enables 
INTERPOL National Central Bureaus (NCBs) and other authorized law enforcement entities – such as 
immigration and border control officers – to ascertain the validity of a travel document (passports, identity 
documents, visas). 
SLTD includes information about stolen blank passports. Travel documents reported lost or stolen to the 
authorities of countries participating in SIS are entered both in SLTD and SIS. The SLTD also holds data on 
travel documents entered by countries not participating in SIS (Ireland, Croatia, Cyprus and third countries). 
Details of stolen and lost passports are submitted directly to the STLD database by INTERPOL NCBs and law 
enforcement agencies via INTERPOL’s 24/7 secure global police communication system. Only the country 
which issued a document can add it to the database. Law enforcement officials at INTERPOL NCBs and other 
locations with access to INTERPOL’s databases through the I-24/7 system – such as airports and border 
crossings – can query the passports of individuals travelling internationally against the SLTD, and immediately 
determine if the document has been reported as lost or stolen so they can take the necessary actions. 
As stated in the Council Conclusions of 9 and 20 November 2015131 and in Regulation (EU) 2017/458132, the 
travel documents of all third-country nationals and persons enjoying the right of free movement should be 
verified against SLTD. All border control posts have to be connected to SLTD.  
 
4.6.2 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, the following aspects of the SLTD should be taken into account:  
                                                          
130 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for the 
comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of [Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 establishing the criteria and 
mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person] , for identifying an illegally staying 
third-country national or stateless person and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' 
law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes (recast), Brussels, 4.5.2016, COM(2016) 272 
final 2016/0132 (COD).  
131 Conclusions of the Council of the EU and of the Member States meeting within the Council on Counter-Terrorism, 20 
November 2015 
132 Regulation (EU) 2017/458 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2017 amending Regulation 
(EU) 2016/399 as regards the reinforcement of checks against relevant databases at external borders.  
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1) It should be recalled that Regulation (EU) 2017/458 imposes the travel documents of both all third-
country nationals and persons enjoying the right of free movement to be verified against SLTD on 
entry and exit of the Schengen Area.  
 
2) To our knowledge, the SLTD database contains no biometric features.  
 
4.7 Advance passenger information (API) 
4.7.1 Purpose 
Council Directive 2004/82/EC133 regulates the transfer of advance passenger information (API) data by air 
carriers to the competent national authorities for the purpose of improving border controls and combating 
illegal immigration. This Directive was adopted following a request by the European Council of 25 and 26 
March 2004, which met following the terrorist attacks in Madrid. The obligations provided for in this Directive 
are complementary to those laid down by Article 26 of the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement, as supplemented by Council Directive 2001/51/EC, concerning the obligation of carriers to return 
third-country nationals who are refused entry by the Member State of destination. 
According to this Directive, air carriers are required to communicate information concerning their passengers 
travelling to a European Union (EU) border crossing. This information is supplied, at the request of the 
authorities responsible for carrying out checks on persons at the external borders of the EU, to improve 
border control and to combat illegal immigration more effectively.  
These data are forwarded to these authorities for passenger registration purposes. In principle they are 
transmitted electronically to these authorities. 
Carriers are required to transmit the following information:  
 the number and type of travel document used, 
 nationality, 
 full names, 
 the date of birth, 
 the border crossing point of entry into the territory of the Member States, 
 code of transport, 
 departure and arrival time of the transportation, 
 total number of passengers carried on that transport, 
 the initial point of embarkation. 
In principle, these data are deleted by these authorities within 24 hours of transmission, provided that the 
passengers have arrived within the territory of the Member States. The personal data are deleted by the 
carrier within 24 hours of arrival of the means of transport. 
No biometric data are collected or processed in the context of the API framework. However, it should be 
noted that Regulation (EU) 2017/458 (which will be discussed below in section 12) provides for the possibility 
to carry out checks in advance against SIS II and SLTD on the basis of passenger data received in accordance 
with Council Directive 2004/82/EC.  
 
                                                          
133 Council Directive 2004/82/EC of 29 April 2004 on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data. 
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4.7.2 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
In the context of the PROTECT project, the following aspects of API should be taken into account: 
1) It should be reminded that API data is currently only regulated at European level in the context of air 
transport. This means that, currently, under EU law, API data could not be used in PROTECT’s scenario 
related to land borders. However, as emphasized by a 2012 study134, it has to be noted that the scope 
of implementation of API systems varies in the different Member States: all Member States collected 
API from air carriers, only three135 also collect API from sea carriers. Some Member States136 often 
collected API only from selected flights which had been assessed as ‘at risk’ of carrying irregular 
migrants and others implement API systems that collect API from all non-EU flights137.  
 
2) It should be recalled that no biometric features for ID verification are processed in the context of 
Council Directive 2004/82/EC. 
 
3) An interesting novelty provided by Regulation (EU) 2017/458 is the fact that the new article 2e of the 
SBC specifies that checks against SIS and SLTD may be carried out in advance on the basis of API data 
received in accordance with Council Directive 2004/82/EC. Where those checks are carried out in 
advance on the basis of such data, the data received in advance shall be checked at the border 
crossing point against the data in the travel document. 
 
4.8 The ETIAS proposal 
4.8.1 Background 
The European Commission’s initiative of establishing a European Travel Information and Authorisation 
System (hereinafter referred to as ‘ETIAS’) dates back to a Communication of 2008 entitled “Preparing the 
next steps in border management in the European Union”.138 In the Communication “Stronger and Smarter 
Information Systems for Borders and Security” of 6 April 2016, the Commission announced that it will assess 
the necessity, technical feasibility and the proportionality of establishing a future European Travel 
Information and Authorisation System.139 The same year, the Commission carried out a Feasibility Study, 
which used as a benchmark three other existing travel authorisation systems in the world: the ESTA in the 
USA, the eTA in Canada and the eVisitor in Australia.140 Finally, on 16 November 2016, the Commission 
introduced a proposal to establish ETIAS to strengthen security checks on visa-free travellers (hereafter the 
                                                          
134 Evaluation on the implementation and functioning of the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data set 
up by Directive 2004/82, Final Report for Directorate-General for Home Affairs, available at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/evaluation/search/download.do?documentId=6412251 
135 DK, ES, UK 
136 AT, CH, CZ, DE, HU, IT, NL, LV – DK and MT also only collect API from selected flights, but it is not clear whether this 
is based on risk assessment or not. 
137 CY, EE, IE, RO, ES, UK 
138 Communication of 13 February 2008 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions "Preparing the next steps in border management in 
the European Union", COM(2008) 69 final. 
139 Communication of 6 April 2016 from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council “Stronger and 
Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security”, COM(2016) 205 final. 
 
140 Feasibility Study of 16 November 2016 for a European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) - Final 
Report available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-
agenda-security/legislative-documents/docs/20161116/etias_feasability_study_en.pdf 
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ETIAS proposal). 141On 6 March 2017, the EDPS issued its opinion.142 In the European Parliament, the proposal 
has been assigned to the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee (LIBE). The rapporteur Kinga Gál 
finalised her draft report on 8 June 2017. By the deadline of 11 July, almost 1 000 amendments were tabled 
to the draft report. On 19 October 2017, the LIBE committee adopted both draft reports, regarding ETIAS 
and amendments to the Europol Regulation (following a decision by the Council to split the proposal into two 
distinct legal acts), as well as a decision to enter into inter-institutional negotiations.143 The Commission 
expects the development of ETIAS to start not long after the Entry/Exit System, in view of also having this 
new system in place in 2020. 
 
4.8.2 Purpose  
Currently, TCNVHs and TCNVEs travellers are subject to border controls when entering the Schengen area. 
According to the SBC, both categories of travellers need to comply with the conditions for short-term stay, 
which include not being a threat to public order and security, holding valid travel documents (including by 
checking SLTD), justifying the purpose and conditions of the intended stay, not being the subject of any alert 
in SIS for the purpose of refusing entry, and having sufficient means of subsistence. However, unlike the 
advance transfer of detailed information required for the visa application procedure of TCNVHs, no such 
advance information is required about TCNVEs arriving at the Schengen external borders. This means that 
border guards need to make a decision on allowing or refusing access to the Schengen area without prior 
knowledge regarding any security, migration or public-health risks associated with persons not requiring a 
visa. This is particularly true for TCNVHs travellers arriving by land, as the only source of information about 
them is their travel document presented at the external border. As regards passengers arriving by air (and in 
some Member States by sea), Council Directive 2004/82/EC obliges carriers to communicate all passenger 
data, known as ‘advance passenger information’ (API), ahead of inbound flights to the EU, including name, 
date of birth, passport number and nationality.  
Hence, the aim of the ETIAS proposal of November 2016 is to verify if TCNVEs have a valid travel 
authorisation, prior to arriving in the Schengen area. A valid ETIAS travel authorisation, obtained in advance 
of arrival at a Schengen border crossing point, will be a precondition for entering the Schengen area. 
However, border guards at the external Schengen borders will still take the final decision to grant or refuse 
entry according to the Schengen Borders Code. The proposed ETIAS will be a largely automated system that 
will gather information on all visa-free travellers that intend to travel to the Schengen area. The proposed 
ETIAS will verify the information submitted via an online application ahead of their travel to the EU’s external 
borders, to assess if they pose a risk for irregular migration, security or public health. 
Applications will be automatically processed against other EU information systems (such as SIS, VIS, EES, SLTD 
and ECRIS), a dedicated ETIAS watch list (established by Europol) and targeted screening rules to determine 
if there are factual indications or reasonable grounds to issue or refuse a travel authorisation. In cases where 
no hits or elements requiring further analysis are identified, travel authorisations will be issued automatically 
within minutes after the application has been submitted. 
                                                          
141 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing a European 
Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS) and amending Regulations, (EU) No 515/2014, (EU) 2016/399, (EU) 
2016/794 and (EU) 2016/1624, COM(2016) 731.  
142 EDPS, Opinion 3/2017 EDPS Opinion on the Proposal for a European Travel Information and Authorisation System 
(ETIAS), 6 March 2017.  
143 This report is available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2017-
0322&language=EN 
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Figure 8 - ETIAS Automated Application Processing 
 
The objective of this automated process is to ensure that: 
• no other valid travel authorisation already exists, the data provided in the application concerning the 
travel document do not correspond to another application for travel authorisation associated with 
different identity data, and the applicant or the associated travel document do not correspond to a 
refused, revoked or annulled application for travel authorisation (ETIAS); 
• the applicant is not subject to a refusal of entry alert (SIS) and/or the travel document used for the 
application does not correspond to a travel document reported lost, stolen or invalidated (SIS and 
Interpol’s SLTD); 
• whether the applicant is not subject to an alert on the basis of a European Arrest Warrant or wanted 
for arrest for extradition purposes (SIS) 
• the applicant has not been reported as an overstayer, at present or in the past, or has was refused 
entry (EES); 
• the applicant had no visa application refused in Visa Information System (VIS – this would be valid 
for nationals of countries which were granted visa waiver status within five years or less and for 
applicants having more than one nationality); 
• the applicant and the data provided in the application corresponds to information recorded in the 
Europol data; 
• a risk assessment is conducted for irregular migration risks, particularly as to whether the applicant 
was subject to a return decision or a removal order issued following the withdrawal or rejection of 
the application for international protection; 
• no criminal record is recorded (ECRIS); 
• the applicant and/or his/her travel document are not subject to an Interpol alert (TDAWN). 
This automated process would also ensure that the applicant is not in the ETIAS watchlist and would verify if 
the applicant has replied affirmatively to any of the ETIAS background questions. 
Deliverable D2.2 PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 
 Page 65 of 71 
 
4.8.3 ETIAS Application and Issuance Process 
The legislative proposal sets out in detail the practical steps and the process for issuing or refusing the travel 




Figure 9 - Traveller's journey with ETIAS 
 
Prior to the intended travel, the applicant completes an online application, via a dedicated website or the 
mobile application. 
To fill in the application, each applicant will be requested to provide the following data: 
• Surname (family name), first name(s), surname at birth, usual name(s); date of birth, place of birth, 
country of birth, sex, current nationality, first names of the parents of the applicant; home address; 
• Travel document; 
• If applicable, any other nationality; 
• Permanent residence information; 
• Email address and phone number; 
• Member State of intended first entry; 
• Education and current occupation details; 
• Answers to a set of ETIAS background questions (as regards conditions with epidemic potential or 
other infectious or contagious parasitic diseases; criminal records; presence in war zones; and any 
previous decision to return to borders or orders to leave the territory of an EU Member State), 
• If the applicant is a minor, the identity of the person responsible for the minor, 
• If the application is submitted by a person different of the applicant, the identity of the person and 
company that he or she represents (if applicable). 
• For family members to EU citizens/third country nationals benefitting from free movement without 
residence cards: their status as family member; the identity details of the family member with whom 
the applicant has ties; their family ties. 
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Filling the application form online would in principle not take more than 10 minutes. Apart from having a 
valid passport, no further documentation would be required to reply to the questions asked. ETIAS would 
accept applications introduced on behalf of the applicant in situations where visa exempt third country 
nationals cannot themselves create an application (for example, because of age, literacy- level, access to and 
inability to use information technology). In such cases, the application may be submitted by a third person 
provided this person's identity is included in the application. 
The process of assessing and deciding on an application would start immediately after the payment of a fee 
is confirmed. The application would be automatically processed. Where applicable, the application would 
undergo manual processing by the ETIAS Central Unit and ETIAS National Unit(s). This automated step will 
process data related to identity data, travel document, and the answers to the background questions. The 
central system will, within minutes, proceed to a fully automated cross-checking of the information provided 
by the applicant against other information systems, a watchlist established in ETIAS and against ETIAS’ 
defined screening rules. 
 
4.8.4 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
The ETIAS proposal does not foresee the processing of biometric data.  
 
5 Interoperability based on fingerprints and facial image 
5.1 Description 
5.1.1 Background 
In its Communication of 6 April 2016 “Stronger and Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security”144, 
the Commission emphasized the need to improve the interoperability of information systems. According to 
the EC, the existing information systems in the EU for border management cover a wide range of 
functionalities. Nevertheless, there are still shortcomings in the functionalities of existing systems and gaps 
in the EU's architecture of data management which have as consequence that border guards face a complex 
landscape of differently governed information systems at EU level.  
For these reasons, the Commission set up a high-level expert group on information systems and 
interoperability (“HLEG”). The HLEG was tasked to address “the legal, technical and operational aspects of 
the different options to achieve the interoperability of the information systems, including the necessity, 
technical feasibility and proportionality of available options and their data protection implications”. The HLEG 
presented recommendations on strengthening and developing the EU’s information systems and 
interoperability first in its interim report of December 2016145 , and later in its final report of May 2017146.  
In its seventh Progress report towards an effective and genuine security union147, the Commission set out a 
new approach to the management of data for borders and security in line with the Communication of 2016 
                                                          
144 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Stronger and Smarter 
Information Systems for Borders and Security, 6.4.2017, COM (2016) 205 final. 
145 Interim report by the chair of the high-level expert group on information systems and interoperability set up by 
the European Commission, Interim report by the chair of the high-level expert group, December 2016, available 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3435 
146 Final report of the high-level expert group on information systems and interoperability set up by the European 
Commission, 11 May 2017; available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=3435 
147 Communication of 16.05.2017 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the 
Council, Seventh progress report towards an effective and genuine Security Union, COM(2017) 261 final. 
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and the recommendations of the HLEG. Under this approach, all centralised EU information systems for 
security, border and migration management should be interoperable so that:  
 the systems can be searched simultaneously using a European search portal;  
 the systems use one shared biometric matching service to enable searches across different 
information systems holding biometric data, possibly with hit/no-hit flags indicating the connection 
with related biometric data found in another system;  
 the systems share a common identity repository with alphanumeric identity data to detect if a person 
is registered under multiple identities in different databases. 
On 8 June 2017, the Council welcomed the Commission’s view and the proposed way forward to achieve the 
interoperability of information systems by 2020. It invited the Commission to pursue the work on three 
dimensions of interoperability (i.e. the European search portal, the biometric matching service and a 
common identity repository).148  
On 17 November 2017, the EDPS published a reflection paper on the interoperability of information systems 
in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice149 to advise the EU institutions on the data protection 
implications of their policies in the field of information management for borders management.  
Finally, on 12 December 2017, the EC published a proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework for 
interoperability between EU information systems (hereafter interoperability proposal).150 In order to achieve 
the objectives of this proposal, the EC considers that four interoperability components need to be 
established:  
 European search portal — ESP  
 Shared biometric matching service — shared BMS  
 Common identity repository — CIR  
 Multiple-identity detector — MID 
The four components combined would lead to the following interoperability solution: 
                                                          
 
 
148 Council conclusions on the way forward to improve information exchange and ensure the interoperability of EU 
information systems, 8 June 2017: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-10151-2017-INIT/en/pdf 
149 EDPS, Reflection paper on the interoperability of information systems in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 
17 November 2017.  
150 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on establishing a framework for 
interoperability between EU information systems (police and judicial cooperation, asylum and migration), Brussels, 
12.12.2017, COM(2017) 794 final.  
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Figure 10 - EC's proposed interoperability solution 
 
5.1.2 The shared biometric matching service (shared BMS) 
The proposed shared biometric matching service (shared BMS) is of particular interest in the context of the 
PROTECT project. Indeed, the shared BMS would enable the querying and comparison of biometric data 
(fingerprints and facial images) from several central systems (in particular, SIS, VIS, EES and EURODAC)151. As 
neither the API framework nor the SLTD and the proposed ETIAS contain biometric data, these would 
therefore not be linked to the shared BMS. 
 
 
Figure 11 - EC's proposed shared BMS 
The idea behind the EC’s proposed shared BMS is that the legal instruments of SIS, VIS, EES and EURODAC do 
not prescribe the technical implementation details of the infrastructure that performs the fingerprint 
identification functions. Instead of a dedicated automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) for each 
individual system, a shared biometric matching service could be implemented. Whereas the former is only 
capable of matching fingerprints, the biometric matching service would be able to process both fingerprints 
and facial images. And rather than serving just one system, the shared biometric matching service would 
perform identifications and verifications for all the centralised systems.  
 
                                                          
151 As well as the proposed ECRIS-TCN system which is out of scope of this deliverable since its purpose is law 
enforcement and not border control management.  
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5.1.3 Legal constraints for PROTECT scenarios 
The EC’s proposed shared biometric matching service confirms the intention of the European Council of 
Thessaloniki to develop a coherent approach on biometric identifiers or biometric data for documents for 
third country nationals, European Union citizens’ passports and information systems.152 
Fingerprints and facial image are increasingly being promoted by the EU as the biometric features which 
should be used in both travel documents and in border control management databases to enhance the tasks 
of border guards. For this reason, the enrolment of additional biometric features (other than fingerprints or 
facial image) in travel documents for the purpose of “facilitating” border control processes as described in 
D3.1 should be considered as being in contradiction with the data minimization principle enshrined in article 
5(c) of the GDPR which reads as follows “personal data shall be adequate, relevant and limited to what is 
necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed”.  
Therefore, for the purposes of D3.1 scenarios, it is recommended to PROTECT technical partners to only focus 
on the development of “emerging” biometric features which could update current facial image standards, 
for example 2D face, iris, periocular and 3D face.  
 
6 Conclusion  
The aim of D2.2 is to explore the current and proposed European legal framework regulating both biometric 
border control and personal data protection in order to identify the legal constraints which should be taken 
into account by the scenarios being defined in D3.1. The main objective of the PROTECT project being to 
develop a contactless multimodal biometric solution for identity confirmation of travellers with the aim to 
facilitate and fasten their border crossings, this deliverable was dedicated to analyse the hereunder main 
legal questions: 
1) Under current EU law, is there a possibility for electronic machine-readable documents to support 
an enhanced set of contactless biometrics? In other words, could emerging biometrics (other than 
facial image and fingerprints) be included in travel documents under current EU law?  
Answer:  Under current EU Regulation, it is very unlikely that inclusion of additional multimodal 
biometrics features (being not facial image or fingerprints) developed within the PROTECT project 
could legally be integrated in ePassports (or residence permits) without a national legislation of a 
Member State allowing it. Furthermore, even if a national law would allow such integration of 
additional biometrics, it would certainly be challenged in Court for privacy reasons related to 
proportionality and data minimization. 
2) Under current EU law, could a smartphone be considered as a travel document to support traditional 
biometrics (fingerprints and facial image) as well as an enhanced set of contactless biometrics?  
Answer:  Under current EU law, it seems very doubtful that mobile devices such as smartphones 
could legally be used to replace travel documents as a result of strict rules regulating the materials 
of travel documents. In other words, smartphones cannot be considered as “travel documents” 
under current EU law and therefore cannot support traditional biometrics (fingerprints and facial 
image) as well as an enhanced set of contactless biometrics for the purpose of border control 
management.  
3) Under current EU law, could consent of a traveller be the legal basis to enrol additional biometrics in 
a travel document for “government use of their personal data”?  
                                                          
152 The Presidency conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council of 19 and 20 June 2003 are available at  
http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11638-2003-INIT/en/pdf 
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Answer: Recital 43 of the GDPR expressly states that: “in order to ensure that consent is freely given, 
consent should not provide a valid legal ground for the processing of personal data in a specific case 
where there is a clear imbalance between the data subject and the controller, in particular where the 
controller is a public authority and it is therefore unlikely that consent was freely given in all the 
circumstances of that specific situation”. This means that it seems that consent of travellers cannot 
be considered as a legitimate basis of lawfulness in PROTECT scenarios to allow public border control 
authorities to speed up their public interest missions by enrolling additional biometrics in travel 
documents.  
4) Under current EU law, which constraints related to the entry/exit external border checks for both 
persons enjoying the EU right to free movement and TCNs should be taken into account by the 
PROTECT scenarios?  
Answer: Both for persons enjoying the EU right to free movement and for TCNs, the travel document 
must be presented for verification at each entry/exit of the Schengen area. For this reason, it is very 
doubtful that the passport scenario at land border crossing points described in D3.1 which envisages 
to transmit passport data via a mobile application could be considered as legal under current EU 
border control regulation since that that travel documents must be presented at each entry/exit of 
the Schengen area. 
5) Under current EU law, which constraints should be taken into account by the PROTECT scenarios 
when making use of technologies such as self-service systems, eGates and automated border control 
systems?  
Answer: Both for persons enjoying the EU right to free movement and for TCNs, it seems very 
doubtful that automated border checks could be operated on the basis of “additional biometrics” 
(other than fingerprints or facial image). Indeed, for persons enjoying the EU right to free movement 
article 8(2) of the SBC explicitly states that “where there are doubts as to the authenticity of the travel 
document or the identity of its holder, at least one of the biometric identifiers integrated into the 
passports and travel documents issued in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 shall be 
verified”. As for TCNs, According to article 8b of the SBC, one of the conditions for persons whose 
border crossing is subject to a registration in the EES to be permitted to use automated border 
control systems is that ”the travel document contains a facial image recorded in the electronic 
storage medium (chip) which can be technically accessed by the self-service system so as to verify the 
identity of the holder of the travel document, by comparing that facial image with his or her live facial 
image”. For this reason, and according to the data minimization principle, it seems legally doubtful 
to use additional biometrics (other than facial image – and in certain cases fingerprints) for the 
aforementioned purpose.  
6) Under current EU law, which checks against databases should be taken into account by the PROTECT 
scenarios and which legal constraints derive from these in relation to the development of a 
contactless solution?  
 
Answer: Under current EU law, checks which should be taken into account at external border 
crossings are mainly the ones against the SIS, SLTD, VIS, EES, EURODAC (and the proposed ETIAS) 
databases as well as the API framework. An overview of the legal constraints related to this 
background is provided in Section 4 of this Deliverable. Currently, one of the main legal constraints 
to take into account when developing a “full” contactless solution is that the VIS is used to verify the 
identity of visa holders by comparing his/her fingerprints with the fingerprints stored in the VIS on 
request of the border guards. The fact that TCNVHs could be required to provide their fingerprint at 
the entry of the Schengen Area should be taken into account when developing a complete 
contactless biometric-based cross-border control solution. The use the facial image for biometric 
matching against the VIS has not yet been implemented. This issue could be resolved once the EES 
will become functional and that TCNVHs would be able to pre-enrol their facial image into that 
system.  
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7) Does the PROTECT scenarios fit in with the EU’s own future border control plans, in particular the 
EC’s proposal for a Regulation on establishing a framework for interoperability between EU 
information systems?  
Answer: The EC’s proposed shared biometric matching service confirms the intention of the 
European Council of Thessaloniki to develop a coherent approach on biometric identifiers or 
biometric data for documents for third country nationals, European Union citizens’ passports and 
information systems.153 Fingerprints and facial image are increasingly being promoted by the EU as 
the biometric features which should be used in both travel documents and in border control 
management databases to enhance the tasks of border guards. For this reason, the enrolment of 
additional biometric features (other than fingerprints or facial image) in travel documents for the 
purpose of “facilitating” border control processes as described in D3.1 should be considered as being 
in contradiction with the data minimization principle enshrined in article 5(c) of the GDPR which 
reads as follows “personal data shall be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in 
relation to the purposes for which they are processed”. Therefore, for the purposes of D3.1 scenarios, 
it is recommended to PROTECT technical partners to only focus on the development of “emerging” 
biometric features which could update current facial image standards, for example 2D face, iris, 
periocular and 3D face.  
As a result of the answers to the aforementioned questions, the scenarios proposed by D3.1 should more 
than certainly be considered as beyond the scope of current legislation. One of the main reasons of this 
negative conclusion is that consent of travellers cannot be considered as a legitimate basis of lawfulness 
under the GDPR to allow public border control authorities to speed up their public interest missions by 
enrolling additional biometrics in travel documents (which currently may not be replaced by a smartphone 
app).  
This being said, Deliverable “D2.3 - Privacy impact of next-generation biometric border” control will analyse 
if, as an alternative to D3.1 scenarios, emerging biometric modalities could be processed in a “passport 
companion” such as a smartphone for “comfort and convenience purposes” of travellers on basis of their 
consent. The idea would be to analyse − from a privacy and data protection point of view − the possibility 
and the conditions to enrol additional contactless biometrics in a smartphone app for travellers willing to join 
a “PROTECT programme” allowing them to be given priority in waiting areas for “traditional” security and 
border checks and/or allowing them to benefit of additional convenience services such as access to VIP 
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This form is related to the Security Sensitivity Assessment procedure which will assure that no sensitive 
information will be included in the publications and deliverables of the PROTECT project. 
Security sensitive information means here all information in whatever form or mode of transmission that is 
classified by Council Decision on the security rules for protecting EU classified information (2011/292/EU) 
and all relevant national laws and regulations. The information can be already classified, or such that it should 
be classified. 
In practice the following criteria is used: 
- Information is already classified 
- Information may describe shortcomings of existing safety, security or operating systems 
- Information is such, that it might be misused. 
- Information that can cause harm to  
o European Union 
o a Member State 
o society 
o industry and companies 
o third country 
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Why? 
 
Date:  26/03/18 








Deliverable D2.2 PROTECT H2020 Project No. 700259 
 Page 5 of 5 
 
 
 
